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ABSTRACT 
Perceived personality consistency is the degree to which an individual believes 
their personality is reliable across situations.  Perceived personality consistency may 
contribute to the personality variability literature because it is a separate individual 
difference measure, rather than measuring change in personality trait self-reports.  
Rather than assessing actual change, perceived personality consistency involves the 
extent to which people see themselves changing.  This individual difference measure 
should be associated with specific attitudes, cognitive styles, and behavior beyond that 
of trait measures.  To capture this construct, I created a Personality Consistency Scale 
(PCS), assessing perceived personality consistency between contexts.  Next, I assessed 
incremental validity in order to compare this scale to similar measures in variability and 
creativity research. Results found psychometric support for a 5-item inventory, which 
correlated with authenticity, indecision, meaning in life, and creative flexibility 
performance on the Alternative Uses Task.  This scale explained variance above that of 
the conceptually similar Self-Pluralism scale and in conjunction with the personality 
trait openness to experience.  These results suggest that perceived personality 
consistency should be assessed in addition to standard trait measures when predicting 
creative performance. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
What kind of person are you at home?  Do you behave differently when you are 
at work, at a social event, or when you were growing up?  People change their behavior 
between contexts and over time (e.g., Helson & Wink, 1992; Kogan, 1990; Pervin, 
1994; Roberts & DelVecchio, 2000). However, the extent to which they recognize this 
change might vary.  On one hand, an individual may perceive themselves behaving 
differently between contexts; their perceptions of themselves may be that they are 
flexible—they change with the demands of the situation.  Because their conception of 
their self is less consistent, their thoughts and behaviors may be more likely to 
objectively shift between contexts.  On the other hand, the individual may perceive 
themselves as the same regardless of context.  
Personality consistency can be assessed through reliability in personality traits 
across contexts within persons (Baird, Le, & Lucas, 2006). In the current work, I 
propose that perceived personality consistency is an individual difference characterized 
by rigidity in thinking: regardless of context, individuals view their personality as not 
changing between different situations.  This may have implications for task 
performance, particularly on tasks that require flexibility in thinking.  Specifically, 
individuals with high personality consistency, who view themselves rigidly, may 
generally have difficulty thinking from different perspectives, should they be required 
to.  This may result in higher incidences of cognitive fixation-- counterproductive 
adherence to a plan or target solution (Smith, 1995)—because a person may become 
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stuck using their typical thinking strategy.  However, lesser perceived consistency (i.e., 
regarding the self as flexible) may result in better performance on creative tasks because 
individuals believe themselves capable of thinking differently.   
Perceived personality consistency is a valuable construct to consider because it 
assesses whether individuals believe they can change in accordance with the situation.  
This may translate into willingness to change, or a propensity to think from different 
perspectives; these beliefs may then influence thinking and behavior.  Conceptually, 
personality consistency should be independent from personality scores; consistency 
involves assessment of variability, which should be unrelated to measures of central 
tendency. Once a scale is validated, the impact of perceived personality consistency on 
flexible thinking can be assessed. 
1.1 Objective Personality Consistency between Contexts 
Directly measuring personality consistency between contexts is uncommon, 
though other literatures hint at individuals acting differently across situations.  Social 
psychology has often concerned itself with the study of strong situations influencing 
behavior.  Historically, psychology’s most famous studies, including the Milgram study 
(Milgram, 1963), the Stanford Prison Experiment (Zimbardo, 1973), and the like, all 
make use of the strong situation—individuals are put into otherwise extraordinary 
circumstances that push their behavior.  Put in technical terms, a strong situation 
reduces the variability of possible response.   
Various reviews of the literature have supported the inference that strong 
situations reduce variability in behavior across persons, thereby influencing behavior 
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despite the impact of personality (e.g., Cooper & Withey, 2009; Meyer et al., 2010). 
From decisions about traffic lights (Mischel, 1977) to whom to save in a fire (e.g., 
Burnstein, Crandall, & Kitayama, 1994), the strong situation has often moderated or 
completely suppressed personality.  However, very little work has been done on the 
reverse, examining personality consistency’s influence on the effects of the situation.  
Dalal and colleagues’ (2015) untested ‘personality strength’ concept—an individual 
difference reducing variability in behavior across persons-- explores this idea.  
Personality strength modulates the variability in behavior across situations within 
persons, potentially dulling the impact of the situation on behavior. 
The idea of personality consistency is not new. Bem and Allen (1974) urged 
psychologists to develop measures to predict who will be ‘cross-situationally 
consistent.’ Personality consistency has been studied in myriad forms throughout 
various literatures, such as self-monitoring and hardiness.  For example, a meta-analysis 
of self-monitoring--an ability to regulate behavior to accommodate social situations 
akin to low personality consistency-- revealed an interaction of Big Five personality 
traits and self-monitoring on job performance. This interaction explained double the 
variance (10%) than the main effects alone (Barrick, Parks, & Mount, 2005).  
Hardiness—a trait characterized by motivation to turn stressful circumstances into 
opportunities for growth-- is another related construct to personality consistency 
(Bartone, 2000).  However, it emphasizes flexibility (both behavioral and cognitive) to 
cope with stressful situations, similar to believing the self changes frequently.  Hardy 
individuals change their perspectives to be more global, emphasizing how they can 
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adapt to overcome obstacles (Maddi, 2006).  A meta-analysis of hardiness found 
negative relationships to strains, stressors, and other external factors after controlling 
for the Big Five personality traits (Eschleman, Bowling, & Alarcon, 2010).  Because 
hardiness has similar elements to personality consistency, these findings suggest that 
personality consistency as an individual difference measure should be considered in 
conjunction with mean personality traits.  
1.2 Perceived Consistency between Contexts 
Perceived personality consistency is the degree to which an individual believes 
their personality is reliable across situations.  I propose that this new construct could 
contribute to the personality literature because it is a separate individual difference 
measure rather than consistency in trait reports.  Modern debates in personality 
consistency concern whether personality traits are essentially static (Costa & McCrae, 
2006) or change in predictable patterns (Roberts, Walton, & Viechtbauer, 2006).  
However, perceived personality consistency involves the extent to which people see 
themselves changing.  This individual difference measure should be associated with 
specific attitudes, cognitive styles, and behavior beyond that of trait measures.  Low 
personality consistency, for example, could represent perceived flexibility (seeing 
oneself as able to adapt to multiple situations). 
These beliefs can also translate to action.  It has been generally accepted that 
perceptions influence behavior: “if men define situations as real, they are real in their 
consequences” (Thomas & Thomas, 1928, p. 529).  Robust effects in psychology, such 
as the self-fulfilling prophecy or the placebo effect (Merton, 1942; Moerman & Jonas, 
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2002), demonstrate how perception can influence reality.  Thus perceived personality 
consistency could have consequences for how people think and behave, regardless of 
the actual consistency of their personality characteristics between contexts.   
I define perceived consistency between contexts as the degree to which an 
individual believes their personality is identical regardless of context.  Individuals low 
in perceived consistency between contexts may believe they try on certain personality 
traits like people try on clothes: an outfit for each occasion.  Measuring this construct is 
useful because it has implications for cognitive fixation.  If an individual perceives their 
personality as highly consistent, it is likely their problem-solving strategies are similarly 
linear. If these individuals are blocked, divergent thinking tasks may be problematic, 
where success involves flexibility. 
No prior studies have directly asked participants to report the degree to which 
they change between contexts on a continuous measure.  Extant research on the topic 
has focused on reports of particular traits within particular contexts, and this work 
suggests it is important to measure perceptions of cross-situational consistency.  
Research as early as Mischel’s (e.g., 1968) has indicated that aggregating measures of 
personality ignores variability; context, he argued, is important for realistic domain-
specific predictions of behavior. For example, Mischel and Shoda (1995) indicated 
individuals reported different perceptions of their personality under different 
hypothetical circumstances; by asking an individual to describe who they were under 
these contexts, the researchers found a distribution of trait consistency.  Some 
individuals were consistent across most contexts, whereas others differed in their self-
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perceptions across even similar contexts.  Cross-culturally, researchers have found 
evidence of intra-individual variability in personality between contexts. Church and 
colleagues (2013), in a sample of five different nations, found that self-reports of 
personality three times daily varied as much as positive and negative affect. Further, 
variability differed among individuals; some individuals remained consistent, whereas 
others substantially changed.  In sum, variability does not appear to be uniform; 
consistency can be seen in some participants, but not others. 
Research in perceived consistency between contexts requires more attention.  
Perceived consistency between contexts lack formal measures entirely.  Though it 
seems that some individuals perceive change across their lifetime or between contexts, 
others do not.  Reviewing the literature, people may have varied beliefs about their 
personality consistency, like other individual differences. 
Inconsistency in personality is not necessarily detrimental.  In fact, lower 
perceived personality consistency might be beneficial in that it permits people to 
flexibly adapt to situations, especially between contexts. Failure to adapt to situations is 
often a symptom of social incompetence or rigidity (e.g., Chiu et al., 1995; Mischel & 
Shoda, 1998).  However, past studies have not directly measured perceived personality 
consistency. Therefore, the first issue addressed in this investigation was to develop a 
measure of perceived personality consistency as an individual difference. 
1.3 Construct Comparisons  
In order to develop a valid scale, it is necessary to test construct validity on 
conceptually similar measures for scale development.  Construct validity is defined as 
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“the degree to which a test measures what it claims, or purports, to be measuring” 
(Cronbach & Meehl, 1955; for a review: Haynes, Richard, & Kubany, 1995). This 
investigation utilized two specific subforms of construct validity—convergent and 
discriminant validity.   
1.3.1 Convergent Validity  
Convergent validity is reflected in the degree to which the construct correlates 
with variables the measure should relate to (Campbell, 1957).  I selected scales which 
conceptually should relate to perceived personality consistency based on empirical 
studies in social and personality personality.   
Authenticity. Authenticity—the feeling that an experience is fundamentally 
authored by the self—has well-established ties to personality variability in the literature. 
Sheldon, Ryan, Rawsthorne, & Ilardi (1997) indicated a strong relationship between 
self-consistency and authenticity.  Authenticity has been tied to feeling consistent in 
within-subject designs of daily diary studies (e.g., Heppner et al., 2008).  As such, I 
utilized the definitive measure of authenticity, Wood’s (2008) Authenticity Scale in this 
investigation. I predicted that greater perceived personality consistency would result in 
higher authenticity; with the perception of rarely changing, an individual might perceive 
it easier to be true to his or her self. 
While this variable sounds conceptually similar to personality consistency, an 
individual can be very inconsistent in their personality and still be authentic; individuals 
who pride themselves on their flexibility can perceive themselves as less consistent but 
still acting true to their Self.  Furthermore, a large component of authenticity is self-
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alienation, which is not included in the current conception of personality consistency.  
Being inconsistent in personality should not necessarily lead to self-alienation or being 
dominated by social others.  Inconsistent perceptions may just mark sensitivity to subtle 
cues in themselves and others and recognition that their personality is different in 
specific situations (Mischel & Shoda, 1998).  In summary, authenticity should not be 
identical to perceived personality consistency, but it should be strongly related. 
Social flexibility.  Research has indicated that greater flexibility in social 
environs may be related to adjusting one's goal priorities and future direction of the self 
(Crone & Dahl, 2012).  It could be that self-reporting oneself as flexible may be 
associated with self-perceptions changing across situations.  Studies have also indicated 
that self-reported flexibility (specifically, the HEXACO personality inventory; Lee & 
Ashton, 2004) may associate with creative behaviors, which may require thinking from 
diverse perspectives (Kinga, Paul, & Şefan, 2015).  In this investigation, I chose the 
HEXACO’s Flexibility subscale to represent social flexibility.  The authors describe 
this subscale as assessing “one’s willingness to compromise and cooperate with others. 
Low scorers are seen as stubborn and are willing to argue, whereas high scorers avoid 
arguments and accommodate others’ suggestions, even when these may be 
unreasonable” (p. 335).  This measure should correlate negatively with perceived 
personality consistency, such that greater perceived consistency predicts lower 
flexibility. 
Indecision. The maladaptive postponing of decision-making—engaging in 
indecision—has been associated with a diffuse self (e.g., Berzonsky, 2008). Berzonsky 
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& Ferrari (1996) found that those with diffuse identities often resorted to decisional 
procrastination relative to more information-oriented individuals.  Individuals high in 
indecision have difficulty completing tasks on time, but experimental work has 
concluded this is not from a cognitive detriment (e.g., Ferrari & Dovidio, 1997; Ferrari 
& Dovidio, 2000)—it is motivational, as people struggle with life choices.  Taken 
together, these studies suggest those high in decisional procrastination may have less of 
a rigid idea of their personalities.  As such, I selected the identical Decisional 
Procrastination scale (Mann et al., 1997) as a convergent validity measure. Indecision 
should negatively relate to perceived personality consistency - participants who see 
themselves as less consistent likely have more difficulty making decisions. 
Meaning in Life. Early research in meaning in life has associated meaning with 
coherence—understanding purpose and taking meaning from events in life (e.g., 
Battista & Almond, 1973; Reker & Wong, 1988).  Meaning in life studies do not 
necessarily implicate personality traits as predictors; recent studies have shown non-
existent to moderate correlations with Big Five factors (e.g., Heintzelman & King, 
2015; Schnell & Becker, 2006; Steger et al., 2006) It’s more likely that personality 
variability is a stronger predictor.  Some researchers have suggested that those with low 
presence of meaning in life and high searching for meaning in life have more 
fragmented or diffuse selves (e.g., Ogawa et al., 1997).  Human and colleagues (2014) 
found that psychological adjustment, an indicator of high meaning in life, predicted 
individuals acting more in line with their personalities.  Meaning in life should correlate 
with perceived personality consistency, such that greater perceived consistency is 
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associated with stronger feelings of meaning in life.  As such, I selected the Meaning in 
Life scale (Steger et al., 2006) as a comparison metric for convergent validity.   
1.3.2 Discriminant Validity  
Discriminant validity tests whether the measure is unrelated to conceptually 
independent measures (Campbell, 1957).  I selected a major paradigm in personality 
psychology to provide evidence of perceived personality consistency’s independence 
from conventional personality measures.   
The Big Five. Theoretically, personality traits should not be meaningfully, 
consistently correlated with perceived personality consistency, as personality 
consistency concerns variability, not central tendency.  Prior research has determined 
that interactions between personality traits and personality variability meaningfully 
increases variance explained in behavior (e.g., Barrick, Parks, & Mount, 2005).  Clifton 
and Kuper (2011) have implicated measures of personality variability as indicators of 
social behavior and interpersonal dysfunction separate from trait measures.  This impact 
of variability can remain predictive even after statistically controlling for personality 
traits (e.g., Eschleman, Bowling, & Alarcon, 2010).  Though past studies suggest that 
personality variability is important to consider in addition to central tendency, none 
have utilized a continuous measure directly measuring perceived personality 
consistency; therefore, I chose to include a measure of the Big Five to provide evidence 
of discriminant validity. I utilized a short, validated scale of the Big Five measures of 
personality to assess this form of validity: the mini-IPIP (Donnellan et al., 2006).   
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1.4 Perceived Consistency and Creative Thinking 
Paired with construct validity, the second issue addressed in this investigation is 
the extent to which perceived personality consistency has implications for cognition: 
predictive validity. Specifically, I hypothesized that less perceived consistency would 
predict more globalized cognitive perspectives and perceptions of flexibility in the self.  
These relationships should stem beyond self-report and into behavior. This can be tested 
by correlating the developed scale with foundational tasks in the creativity literature, 
which have implications for cognition and flexibility.  If perceived personality 
consistency between contexts can predict flexibility in creative performance better than 
other similar measures, then it has incremental validity. 
I hypothesized that perceived personality consistency would be associated with 
creativity because past studies indicate creative individuals are more flexible.  One 
quality that researchers have described in creative people is an integration of 
dichotomies (Barron, 1969).  Creative individuals appeared highly flexible, in that they 
embodied ranges of personality traits within themselves (Barron & Harrington, 1981). 
Observational studies have characterized creative people as paradoxical in traits 
(Barron, 1965, 1969).  They might be disciplined and systematic in pursuing their craft, 
but keep their workplace messy; they might have high levels of hardiness and mental 
strength, despite being neurotic.  This suggests that creative individuals are ones that 
often assume different personality traits under different contexts, a component of (low) 
personality consistency and potentially flexibility.   
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This “integration of dichotomies” quality may also explain why no one five-
factor personality trait has emerged as a reliable predictor of creativity.  Many 
researchers have attempted to typify what makes a person creative or the personality 
traits that predispose individuals to excel in creative careers (e.g., Amabile, 1996; 
Shalley, Zhou, & Oldham, 2004; Wang & Cheng, 2010), but the findings are 
contradictory.  Some studies have found that openness to experience predicts creativity, 
whereas other studies have found conscientiousness to predict creativity (Feist, 1998, 
2010).  Effect sizes between creative persons and comparison groups typically range 
from small (d = .20) to moderate (d = .50), according to DeVellis’ (2012) standards. 
However, different types of creative people (i.e., artists vs. scientists) have different 
personality traits, indicating that no one personality factor consistently predicts creative 
performance (Cross, Cattell, & Butcher, 1967).   
1.4.1 Components of Creativity  
Though no one five-factor personality trait has predicted creativity performance, 
flexibility appears to be important.  Several studies suggest that environments 
conducive to global and flexible processing result in the most creative individuals (e.g., 
De Dreu et al., 2011; Oldham & Cummings, 1996). Specifically, individuals engaging 
in tasks and workplaces framed to promote creativity thinking, as opposed to more 
controlling or detail-oriented environments, were associated with higher evaluations of 
creative performance by supervisors and more patent disclosures written—a common 
measure of creative output (Keller & Holland, 1983; Pelz & Andrews, 1966). Another 
study attempted to characterize the thinking style of creative individuals (Meneely & 
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Portillo, 2005).  The researchers utilized the Herrmann Brain Dominance Instrument 
(Bunderson, Olson, & Herrmann, 1982) to typify individuals’ perceived strategies in a 
creative task.  Researchers differentiated between four cognitive styles: limbic 
(affective), cerebral (analytical), left (local), and right (global).  Participants engaged in 
a creative task: design of an original piece of furniture for book storage.  Results 
indicated that no one cognitive style predicted creative performance; however, 
perceived flexibility between the possible four styles did.  If the individuals reported 
they were well-practiced in multiple styles, their actual scores were higher than if they 
were superior in any one cognitive style. This finding suggests that people who 
perceived themselves as utilizing multiple perspectives should be more effective in 
creativity tasks. 
Creative self-efficacy—the belief that one can be creative (Amabile, 1983; 
Bandura, 1977, 1997)—is also positively correlated with scores on creative tasks 
(Schoen, 2015; Tierney & Farmer, 2002).  Many studies suggest that stronger beliefs 
that one can think creatively and flexibly to solve a problem predict better outcomes 
(e.g., Gong, Huang, & Farh, 2009), although there is some evidence to the contrary 
(e.g., Reiter-Palmon et al., 2012).  One study indicated that perceived flexibility 
(defined here as the perceived ability to produce ideas in multiple categories) was 
highly related to creative self-efficacy as well as higher motivation to achieve in class 
(Putwain, Kearsley, & Symes, 2012). Creative self-efficacy is related to increases in 
creative performance that persist over time, and it can be conferred with creativity 
training techniques in students and employees (Mathison & Bronnick, 2009; Tierney & 
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Farmer, 2011). Experimental studies characterizing the relationship between perception 
and performance suggest causal directionality. For example, in studies where 
individuals were influenced to believe they were creative, they offered more creative 
solutions to problems through flexible thinking (Locke et al., 1984; Redmond, 
Mumford, & Teach, 1993).  Together, these findings reveal that making an individual 
believe they are flexible (i.e., able to think originally in multiple different categories) or 
creative often inspires actual creativity. 
1.4.2 Measurement of Creativity  
Some creativity studies use raters trained to assess multiple scores of creativity 
in order to sum them to a total score, indicating overall creative performance.  Though 
measures and operationalization varies among studies, researchers have often used four 
facets to rate creativity of problem-solving: Fluency, Originality, Flexibility, and 
Elaboration. These measures have been featured in early studies of creativity (for a 
review, Guilford, 1967; Torrance, 1974) and have remained relevant in longitudinal 
studies (Cramond et al., 2005; Runco et al., 2010).  Qualities of these performance 
measures are detailed below, as well as a hypothesis about its relation to perceived 
personality consistency. 
Having high Fluency indicates generating a large number of solutions to 
problems.  This skill can be important, as it suggests that individuals have the intrinsic 
motivation to be creative (Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Gardner, 1993).  Research also has 
found that considering intrinsic reasons to perform may be sufficient to boost creativity 
on the task (Greer & Levine, 1991).  As such, individuals with low perceived 
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personality consistency may benefit in fluency, since it would be easier to consider 
reasons to perform that matter to them; however, since perceived personality 
consistency concerns itself with shifting perspectives, this association may be weak. As 
such, in this investigation, I hypothesized that creative fluency was unrelated to 
perceived personality consistency. 
Originality is often scored by comparing each response to other responses from 
all participants.  If a response occurs infrequently (usually by percentage of the overall 
dataset), the response is deemed original; some researchers also award additional points 
for unique responses or, instead, subjectively code all responses. Originality has often 
been inspired by thinking broadly cognitively or shifting self-perceptions to be more 
global (e.g., De Dreu et al., 2011; Friedman, et al., 2003).  This appears similar to 
perceived personality consistency, in that lower consistency indicates a broader image 
of the self; as such, it is possible that lower perceived personality consistency could be 
modestly associated with originality.   However, Fluency often influences Originality - 
having more responses may grant more originality points.  To control for this 
contamination, Originality scores have sometimes been divided by an individual’s 
Fluency score (e.g., Hocevar, 1979).  I hypothesized that creative originality was 
modestly related to the PCS, such that lower perceived personality consistency was 
associated with more original responses. 
Elaboration is defined as exploring an idea in detail.  Defining a solution does 
not involve Elaboration; it must be detailed, bringing in specific elements in a 
visualized solution.  Research has shown that Elaboration in some situations might be 
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weakly correlated with other creativity facets (Verhaeghen, Joorman, & Khan, 2005).  
Consider that on a timed task, elaborating necessarily prevents individuals from 
generating new ideas (Fluency) or from creating new, unique ideas (Originality).  If the 
idea to be elaborated on is not a unique idea, this rumination might be detrimental to 
creative problem solving.  However, if the idea to be elaborated on is both innovative 
and practical, elaboration would be indicative of creativity.  I hypothesized that creative 
elaboration was unassociated with perceived personality consistency—elaboration does 
not represent an ability to think from multiple perspectives.  It represents an ability to 
think deeply about one perspective.  
Flexibility is defined as being able to make connections across domains and 
between ideas that seemed unconnected.  Individuals with high Flexibility scores look 
at a challenge or generate options by examining a situation from multiple perspectives 
(Torrance, 1974).  It is often thought of as a process measure—reframing perspectives 
until a suitable idea is found (e.g., Shah, Millsap, Woodward, & Smith, 2012).  For 
example, one individual might offer solutions where an object is used as a weapon, 
building-block, musical instrument, and an art piece.  Even if another individual offered 
as many solutions, but included only building-block-related solutions, they would score 
low in Flexibility.  I hypothesized that high Flexibility would be closely tied to low 
perceived personality consistency; those with low perceived consistency should be able 
to generate ideas from multiple domains because they conceive of their selves similarly.  
Of the four creativity metrics, I expected this one to associate most with perceived 
personality consistency.  
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1.5 Overview of Studies 
The present investigation developed a scale to measure perceived personality 
consistency and then explore the relationship of perceived personality consistency 
between contexts to creative cognition. There is no existing scale to measure perceived 
consistency as a continuous measure; therefore, my first objective was to create a 
Personality Consistency Scale (PCS), measuring perceived consistency between 
contexts.  Study 1 was dedicated to creating a reliable and valid measure to be tested 
incrementally.  PCS should be particularly important for creative thinking because of its 
proposed link to flexibility. I hypothesized PCS was correlated with other constructs 
selected above for convergent validity: authenticity, social flexibility, indecision, and 
meaning in life.  For discriminant validity, I hypothesized that the PCS should not be 
highly correlated with any one personality trait.  PCS may be associated with very 
predictable decision-making strategies; individuals may believe themselves to be very 
decisive across situations, authentic in how they act, and knowledgeable about their 
place in the world if they perceive their selves to be very consistent.  However, in line 
with personality strength theory (Dalal et al., 2015), the PCS might not correlate 
strongly with any one five-factor personality trait because variability is complimentary 
but not necessarily contingent on central tendency.  
 Study 2 was primarily concerned with predictive validity and incremental 
validity.  I first tested predictive validity of the PCS, measuring the association of 
perceived personality consistency between contexts and creative performance, focusing 
on the outcome of Flexibility on the alternative uses task.  I then explored the 
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incremental validity of the PCS by comparing its performance relative to pre-existing 
measures of personality. Specifically, I hypothesized that lower PCS was associated 
with better performance on a creative task, even when compared to similar inventories 
such as the Self-Monitoring scale and Self-Pluralism scale. 
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2. STUDY 1: SCALE DEVELOPMENT AND VALIDATION 
 
 The first study was aimed at developing a perceived personality consistency 
measure.  To prepare for the full study, two pilot studies were conducted.  The aim of 
these pilots was to explore the existence of multiple factors in perceived personality 
consistency.  
The initial pilot study (N = 30) included four subscales on the PCS.  Two of the 
preliminary factors have been discussed extensively in past research on personality 
consistency: consistency across a lifetime (CAL: 10 items) and consistency between 
contexts (PCS: 7 items).  However, I also included two exploratory subscales: a short-
term consistency across time subscale (CAT: 6 items) and a subscale for belief in 
personality resilience (PR: 6 items).  The CAT subscale examined perceived changes in 
personality within the past year.  The PR subscale considered how difficult individuals 
perceived it was to change their personality.  Individual items for this initial PCS are 
detailed in Appendix B.  However, these initial items were either not reliable, did not 
load onto a singular factor, or did not correlate with other variables with which they 
conceptually should have correlated if the subscales were measuring what they were 
intended to measure.  CAT—the subscale assessing perceived change across the last 
year-- did not correlate with CAL, even though both are measures of temporal 
personality consistency.  PR—a scale involving perceived difficulty of changing one’s 
personality—appeared to confuse participants, as the resulting distribution was uniform.  
Both of these exploratory subscales were removed in future designs.  Examination of 
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alpha coefficients revealed that two items in the PCS did not correlate with other items 
on the subscale and were removed in future administrations of the scale. 
 In a second pilot (N = 30) with the remaining 15 items, a principle components 
analysis with Varimax Rotation found support for a two-factor model with groupings as 
predicted.  Factor 1 appeared to represent Consistency across a Lifetime (CAL; 10 
items). Factor 2 appeared to represent Consistency between Contexts (PCS; 5 items). 
However, even after combining the two pilot studies (N = 60), CAL correlated with no 
other exploratory variables.  As such, this subscale was removed; further studies 
primarily explored the 5-item perceived consistency between contexts scale for PCS. 
2.1 Participants 
 Undergraduate students from an introductory psychology subject pool 
participated for partial course credit (N = 113).  This study was conducted fully online 
and outside the lab.  As such, there was concern that students may not pay full attention 
to their questionnaires.  In an attempt to remove inattentive participants, an a priori 
exclusion criterion of participants was created.  I removed all participants who 
completed the survey in under 5 minutes and whose mean response on all Qualtrics 
items (with no reverse scoring) indicated they just clicked the same point on every 
questionnaire (n = 17). I removed outliers from consideration in analyses as defined by 
Cook’s D scores. Cook’s D (Cook, 1977) is a statistic used to indicate influential data 
points that may need to be checked for validity; though there are wide interpretations of 
which D values are acceptable, the most common metric is a Cook’s D value of 1.00 or 
4/N-k-1. This may indicate a leverage point meriting removal. Some statisticians have 
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warned that such diagnoses should avoid hard numbers and to consult time series 
figures (Bollen & Jackman, 1990); therefore, for every data point removed, a time series 
figure illustrating the magnitude of the outliers is linked in the Appendices.  After 
exclusions, 96 participants (53% female; Mage = 18.89, SDage = 1.35) remained in the 
dataset. 
2.2 Measures and Procedure 
Participants accessed a secure, anonymous Qualtrics survey via SONA systems 
in exchange for partial course credit.  Assigning credit was automated, such that 
researchers did not require and could not ascertain personally identifiable information.  
Participants first completed the Personality Consistency Scale (PCS).  The survey was 
randomized after the Personality Consistency Scale, such that participants did not 
complete the scales in the same order.  This structure prevented order effects.  After 
completing all scales, participants responded to demographic questions. 
The PCS consisted of five items, assessing perceived consistency between 
contexts.  Participants were instructed to indicate the extent to which they agreed or 
disagreed with the statement regarding their own personalities. Participants responded 
on a 7-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree), where higher scores 
indicated greater perceptions of personality consistency.  As such, the highest scoring 
individuals perceived that they were unlikely to change their behaviors across their 
lifetime or due to situational cues.  A full listing of items can be found in Table 1.  
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2.2.1 Convergent Validity 
 The descriptive statistics and Cronbach’s alphas for measures hypothesized to be 
related to the PCS can be found in Table 2. 
Social flexibility. I measured self-reported flexibility via the Flexibility subscale 
(Appendix C) in the HEXACO Personality Inventory (Lee & Ashton, 2004).  In the 
HEXACO, flexibility is seen as a facet of agreeableness.  Responses to this 10-item 
subscale were collected on a 5-point scale (1=strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree).  
Flexibility’s alpha in the HEXACO-PI study was .75. I expected that individuals lower 
in personality consistency would report higher flexibility, due to perceiving personality 
as more variable. 
Meaning in Life. Presence and search for meaning in life were assessed with the 
Meaning in Life Questionnaire (MILQ; Steger et al., 2006).  The MILQ is a 10-item 
inventory consisting of two subscales: Presence and Searching (Appendix D).  Higher 
scores on the Presence subscale indicated more of a belief in meaningful existence or 
life purpose.  Higher scores in the Searching subscale indicated less of this meaning or 
purpose.  Participants reported their agreement with 10 statements on a 7-point scale 
(1=absolutely untrue; 7=absolutely true).  Past studies indicated that the MILQ alphas 
were over .80.  I expected that Purpose subscale responses would relate positively to 
personality consistency, since highly consistent individuals may have found their life 
purpose or a reason to act consistently across situations.  However, I expected that 
Searching would indicate a perception of less consistency in personality; perceiving 
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oneself as having a wide range of personality may suggest an individual is searching for 
their place in the world. 
Authenticity.  I measured perceptions of authenticity with Wood and colleagues’ 
(2008) Authenticity Scale (Appendix E).  The Authenticity Scale is a 12-item 7-point 
scale (1 = does not describe me at all; 7 = describes me very well).  Higher scores on the 
Authenticity scale indicated lower self-alienation, greater congruence between beliefs 
and behavior, and lower acceptance of external influence.  Historically, test-retest 
reliability measures for the Authenticity scale are over .78 up to 4 weeks after testing 
(Wood et al., 2008).   
Indecision.  The Melbourne Decision Making Questionnaire (Mann et al., 1997) 
contains a subscale for indecision—defined as the maladaptive postponing of decision-
making (Appendix F).  This indecision subscale is a 5-item measure on a 7-point scale 
(1=strongly disagree; 7=strongly agree).  Higher scores on this measure indicated 
greater indecision and delay of decision making.  The original study reports an alpha of 
.81 for the Indecision subscale.  This scale has been validated in the U.S., Australia, 
New Zealand, Japan, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, among others.  I hypothesized that the 
indecision scale would negatively relate to perceived personality consistency - 
participants who see themselves as less consistent were expected to have more difficulty 
making decisions.   
Attitudinal Consistency. I created exploratory items that assessed non-clinical 
rigidity in beliefs.  Though not validated, the measures may contribute to construct 
validity by testing whether the PCS highly correlated with attitude consistency, 
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specifically maintaining attitudes despite situational influence.  There were 8 items 
presented on a 7-point Likert scale (1=strongly disagree; 7= strongly agree). Higher 
scores indicated that attitudes and beliefs were unlikely to shift.  A complete listing of 
this exploratory measure is included in Appendix G. 
2.2.2 Discriminant Validity 
Mini-IPIP. Participants completed a short five-factor model personality 
questionnaire. The Mini-IPIP (Appendix H) consisted of 20 items, with four items per 
personality trait: extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, neuroticism, and 
intellect (openness to experience).  The Mini-IPIP is effective because of its concision 
and strong predictive relationship to the larger 50-item International Personality Item 
Pool (Donnellan et al., 2006).  Responses were collected on a 7-point scale (1=very 
inaccurate; 7=very accurate).  In five studies, the Mini-IPIP previously demonstrated 
internal consistency, with alphas well above .60.  Correlations to the IPIP were often 
above .80, demonstrating the validity of this shorter, more practical scale.  I expected 
that personality consistency would be unrelated to specific personality traits or have 
relatively modest relationships with personality factors like openness or neuroticism. 
2.3 Results 
2.3.1 Gender  
Before assessing psychometric properties, I explored potential gender 
differences.  The five-item PCS did not differ in males (M = 4.37, SD = .16) or females 
(M = 4.56, SD = .15), t (88) = .89, p = .38. Overall, consistent with predictions, there 
were no significant effects which might affect primary analyses.  
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2.3.2 Internal Consistency  
I utilized Cronbach’s alpha to measure internal consistency of the items.  
Internal consistency is a form of reliability analysis measuring the extent to which items 
proposed to measure the same general construct produce similar scores.  The 
Cronbach’s alpha for the PCS was .84.  A listing of items and inter-item correlations for 
the PCS is reported in Table 3.  Overall, the PCS performed well by Clark and Watson’s 
(1995) standards, reaching an average inter-item consistency of .41.  This fell within the 
recommended range (.40 to .50) for specific constructs in scale development. 
2.3.3 Convergent Validity 
All possible pair-wise correlations for Study 1 are reported in Table 4.  PCS 
scores were negatively related to Flexibility, r(94) = -.26, p = .03.  As expected, as 
perception of consistency increased, flexibility appeared to decrease.  I conducted 
correlations between personality consistency subscales and the Meaning in Life 
subscales: Presence of Meaning and Searching for Meaning.  Consistent with 
hypotheses, the PCS was associated with both MILQ subscales.  The PCS and Presence 
of Meaning were positively related, r(94) = .27, p < .01; PCS and Searching for 
Meaning were negatively related, r(94) = -.27, p < .01. The PCS had a strong positive 
relationship with Authenticity, r(94) = .48, p < .01.  As predicted, when participants 
reported higher consistency between contexts, they also reported feeling more authentic. 
The PCS scale was strongly associated with indecision scores, r(94) = -.46, p < .01. 
This aligned with predictions that indecision was negatively correlated with perception 
of personality consistency.  There was a positive relationship between PCS and attitude 
 
 
26 
 
consistency, r(94) = .31, p < .01.  Consistent with our exploratory hypotheses, 
participants perceived consistency was associated with lower self-report of shifting 
attitudes in the present day.  Overall, the data appeared to fit predictions, lending 
support for the PCS’s convergent validity. 
2.3.4 Discriminant Validity 
Zero-order correlations were conducted between each level of the Big Five and 
the two personality consistency variables.  Extraversion (r(94) = .13, p = .12), 
Conscientiousness (r(94) = .05, p < .61), Agreeableness (r(94) = -.11, p = .35), and 
Openness (r(94) = -.10, p = .20) were unrelated to the PCS.  Counter to predictions, 
Neuroticism was associated with perceived consistency between contexts, r(94) = -.30, 
p < .01.  Cook’s D indicated one outlier for removal (Appendix I), and excluding this 
outlier did not substantially alter the relationship, r(94) = -.25, p = .02.   
I utilized a multiple regression with each personality factor (extraversion, 
conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, openness) as predictors and each of the 
subscales as the outcome.  We also approached the analysis in this matter because, 
despite the claim that the five factors of personality are orthogonal, there are often 
modest correlations among them; this sample was similar, as shown in Table 4.  Similar 
criticisms for other five-factor models have been registered in the personality literature 
(see Block, 1995; Funder, 2001).  We used multiple regression analyses to examine 
unique effects, controlling for other factors.  
 For PCS, neuroticism was significant predictor, controlling for the other four 
factors, β = -.31, t(94) = -2.60, p < .05.  However, there were five leverage points 
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according to Cook’s D above the exclusion criterion (Appendix J).  Upon removal, 
neuroticism became non-significant, β = -.15, t(89) = -1.26, p = .22.  Extraversion (β = 
.12, t(89) = 1.53, p = .13), Conscientiousness (β = .04, t(89) = .39, p = .70), 
Agreeableness (β = .17, t(89) = 1.63, p = .11), and Openness (β = .08, t(89) = .78, p = 
.44) were unrelated to PCS.  The internal consistency reliability for neuroticism was 
unacceptable by DeVellis’ (2012) standards (α = 0.56); therefore, this result may have 
been spurious.  For the most part, PCS also appeared weakly related to five-factor 
personality trait measures, lending some support for discriminant validity. 
2.4 Discussion 
The PCS measure developed in Study 1 demonstrated acceptable levels of 
reliability.  The analyses bolstered the PCS’s construct validity. For convergent validity, 
perceived consistency between contexts related to attitude consistency (+), flexibility (-
), presence of meaning (+), searching for meaning (-), authenticity (+), and indecision (-
).  For discriminant validity, perceived personality consistency was not related to 
reported levels of personality traits (with the exception of Neuroticism, which had 
questionable internal consistency).  Overall, the PCS was correlated in expected 
directions with these related variables.  However, another study must assess predictive, 
incremental, and construct validity of the PCS with greater rigor.  Specifically, the PCS 
associations should be compared with other similar measures to an outcome variable: 
creativity.  Not only will this further validate the scale, but it will demonstrate, relative 
to other measures, how predictive of creativity the PCS can be. 
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3. STUDY 2: CONSISTENCY AND CREATIVITY 
 
3.1 Predictive and Incremental Validity  
Study 2 addressed two major psychometric concerns, the first of which was 
predictive validity-- the extent to which a score on a scale or test predicts scores on a 
criterion measure (Cronbach & Meehl, 1955).  I predicted that perceived personality 
consistency would be associated with creativity because creative individuals are often 
characterized as flexible in their approach to problem-solving (e.g., Barron, 1969; 
Barron & Harrington, 1981).  This suggests that creative individuals often assume 
different personality traits under different contexts, typical of low personality 
consistency. 
I chose the alternative uses task, a prominent divergent thinking task, to 
operationalize creative performance. Divergent thinking tasks have been used as a 
measure of creative potential for decades (e.g., Torrance, 1966; Wallach & Kogan, 
1965; Wilson, Gilbert, & Christensen, 1953). The alternative uses task consists of a 
timed activity in which participants must report as many alternative uses as they can for 
a common, household object.  Considerable work has tested reliability and validity of 
the alternative uses task (for reviews: Runco, 2010; Runco & Acar, 2012).  In line with 
the task, I collected data and utilized coders for the four measures of creativity: Fluency, 
Flexibility, Originality, and Elaboration.  However, I predicted that the PCS would most 
be related to the task’s Flexibility score.  Provided the data was consistent with 
predictions, this would lend support for predictive validity of the PCS. 
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The other concern addressed in Study 2 was incremental validity of the PCS—
whether it predicted outcomes better than existing inventories.  Haynes and Lench 
(2003) summarize incremental validity as “the degree to which a measure explains or 
predicts some phenomena of interest, relative to other measures” (p. 457). The newly 
developed measure should have an effect on the phenomenon of interest, even 
controlling for similar effects from pre-existing measures.  The authors note that, 
lacking a gold standard for comparison, a new scale should be compared to commonly 
used measures in a similar domain.  
3.2 Construct Comparisons 
For this investigation, I selected measures that appear similar to perceived 
personality consistency for comparison. Though they are somewhat similar to the 
conceptualization of the PCS, they harbor flaws which impede measuring perceived 
personality consistency directly. 
3.2.1 Self-pluralism  
The Self-Pluralism scale (McReynolds et al., 2000; Appendix K) is a measure of 
self-pluralism—the degree to which individuals see themselves as behaving and feeling 
similarly across situations.  This inventory takes the form of either a 30-item (SPS-30) 
or 10-item (SPS-10) dichotomous response measure.  Higher scores indicate greater 
pluralism of personality, interpreted as people behaving or feeling different in various 
contexts.   
At first glance, this measure appears very similar to a perceived personality 
consistency scale.  However, there are two major drawbacks to the SPS.  First, the SPS 
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often conflates perceived consistency across a lifetime with between situations; there 
are double-barreled items such as “I change very little from time to time, or from one 
situation to another.”  The second is that the scale has a binary response; the scale is a 
True-False measure with one factor.  Some researchers have criticized dichotomous 
response scales as less reliable than Likert-type formats.  When responses yield 
imbalanced distributions (participants almost solely choosing True or False), Comrey 
(1988) notes that correlations become distorted when using a dichotomous scale.  
Dichotomous scales also remove nuance a continuum provides (e.g., Krosnick & 
Presser, 2010), which may be important for a concept like personality variability; if one 
often changes, participants may be less willing to select a forced-choice.  As such, I 
predicted that a continuous response scale specifically targeting perceived consistency 
between situations would be a stronger predictor of creative flexibility. 
3.2.2 Self-monitoring   
Lennox’s (1984) self-monitoring scale (SMS, Appendix M) consists of two 
factors—ability to modify self-presentation and sensitivity to expressive behavior of 
others.  Like perceived personality consistency, the SMS concerns itself with individual 
perceiving their own changes across situations.  However, the inventory relies very 
heavily on an individual’s ideas of their own intuition and social contexts.  There is also 
a focus on ease of changing: “I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different 
people and different situations.” This may not reflect how often they perceive 
themselves to change; rather, it could be a reflection of how an individual could change 
if they wanted to change.  Perceived personality consistency may also be reflected 
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outside of social contexts, such as open-mindedness and creativity.  In short, these 
facets may not always be driven by an ability to respond to others. 
I also submitted variables for consideration that may directly relate to creativity 
in order to compare the magnitude of associations— Self-Monitoring (Lennox, 1984, 
Appendix M), Need for Cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1984, Appendix N), and Theories 
of Intelligence (Dweck, 2000, Appendix O).  These scales have a theoretical basis for 
an association with creativity, though no studies to my knowledge have done so 
directly.  
3.2.3 Need for Cognition  
Need for Cognition—feeling satisfaction from thinking—may imply greater 
creativity, as enjoying thinking may result in more solutions to a problem.  Likewise, 
believing in the ability to increase one’s intelligence may result in thinking laterally to 
solve problems.  Research indicates that high self-monitors have preferences for 
information other than their own (Gangestad & Snyder, 2000; Snyder, 1974)—this may 
allow high self-monitors to integrate different forms of information.  Therefore, it might 
be that high self-monitors more often think from different perspectives, which is useful 
in divergent thinking tasks.   
3.2.4 Creative Performance  
Further, I compared the PCS with a self-report scale of creative ability.  Gough’s 
Creative Performance Scale (CPS; Gough, 1979, Appendix P) was used—a seminal 
scale in the creativity literature. I hypothesized that the PCS would contribute variance 
explained above that of the CPS in its associations with actual creative ability. 
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Dollinger’s (2003) results found it was highly correlated with Openness to Experience 
(r = .60) in one study comparing its performance with Creative Behavior Inventory. 
However, many authors have advised against generalizing this result to all measures of 
creativity (Feldhusen & Goh, 1995; Hocevar, 1981; Hocevar & Bachelor, 1989; Houtz 
& Krug, 1995).  Though the CPS has not been directly compared to creative 
performance, relationships were similar enough to include in the incremental models. 
3.2.5 Self-theories of Intelligence  
Early theorists on intelligence have discussed fluid thought and how it was 
related to creative performance judgments and accuracy (e.g., Sternberg, 1985).  They 
concluded that if people believed themselves to be able to always learn and adapt, then 
it made it easier to perform.  This idea has been somewhat validated in modern 
psychological studies on creativity.  First, Furnham and colleagues (2005) indicated that 
self-theories about creativity were related to creative performance.  This was mediated 
by creative self-efficacy.  Gong, Huang, and Farh (2009) supported this by noting that 
learning orientation—here, being able to continuously change and improve—was 
related to creativity.  Similarly, the effect was mediated by creative self-efficacy.  
Though both relationships were modest, self-theories appeared to have some 
relationship to creativity.  As such, I selected Dweck’s (2000) scale of self-theories of 
intelligence as a potential competing measure for incremental validity. 
3.2.6 Openness  
Finally, I utilized a trait measure of openness to experience from a recent Big 
Five validation study (Open-mindedness: Soto & John, 2016). Furnham and Bachtiar 
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(2008) indicated the openness to experience has a modest significant relationship with 
divergent thinking tasks.  I selected the Big Five Inventory II, a new, fully validated 
scale, including a measure of openness, in order to attain the most complete and current 
measures of openness to experience (BFI-II, Soto & John, 2016). 
Overall, I hypothesized that PCS scores would predict flexibility scores on the 
alternative uses task, a measure of divergent thinking.  I also predicted that the PCS 
would predict flexibility scores better than pre-existing measures of personality 
variability and self-reported creativity.  Provided these predictions were accurate, it 
would lend support to predictive and incremental validity of the PCS. 
3.3 Method  
3.3.1 Participants 
 204 participants were recruited from an introductory psychology subject pool.  
One participant admitted they completed an identical task and was removed from the 
analysis, leaving 203 participants.  The typical participant was in their late teens (M = 
18.73, SD= 1.88).  Participants were primarily underclassmen; there were 147 freshmen, 
43 sophomores, 10 juniors, and 3 seniors.  The sample had a gender disparity with 141 
females and 62 males.  Politically, the sample was conservative; there were 108 
Republicans, 45 Democrats, 36 Independents, and 7 Libertarians (with 7 identifying as 
Other.)   Participants often identified as Christian; 93 were Protestant, 80 were Catholic, 
9 were Agnostic, 4 were Atheist, 3 were Hindu, and 3 were Islam, while 10 identified as 
Other. 
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3.3.2 Procedure 
 Participants were brought to a laboratory environment and were instructed to 
complete a Qualtrics survey about their own personality.Participants completed similar 
surveys to Study 1 via Qualtrics to retest the PCS’ validity and replicate findings.  Zero-
order correlations of all variables were assessed.  All scales were randomized in their 
appearance of the survey to prevent potential order effects.  The survey included a 
variety of measures: the PCS (Table 1), the mini-IPIP (Donnellan et al., 2006; Appendix 
H); the HEXACO flexibility subscale (Lee & Ashton, 2004; Appendix C); the Meaning 
in Life Scale (Steger et al., 2006; Appendix D); the Authenticity Scale (Wood et al., 
2008; Appendix E); and the Melbourne Decision Making Questionnaire’s Indecision 
subscale (Mann et al., 1997; Appendix F).   
Incremental Validity. New scales were also inserted into Study 2’s Qualtrics 
survey.  Forced stepwise regression models of variables theoretically analogous to the 
PCS were created in a method consistent with various incremental validity studies 
(Haynes & Lench, 2003; Lench & Chang, 2006; Kluemper et al., 2015; Ruiz et al., 
2014).  Initially, I separated all measures into either personality metrics or creativity 
metrics, with the intention to combine all measures into a final regression model.  I used 
the Big Five Inventory II’s conceptualization of open-mindedness (BFI-openness; Soto 
& John, 2016; Appendix L), the Self-Monitoring scale (Lennox, 1984; Appendix M), 
and the Self-Pluralism scale (McReynolds et al., 2000; Appendix K) as comparison 
measures for the initial model (personality). 
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Open-mindedness was measured as a Big Five variable with 12 items on a 5-
point scale (1=disagree strongly; 5=agree strongly).  Higher scores indicated greater 
intellectual curiosity, aesthetic sensitivity, and creative imagination (Soto & John, 
2016).  Historically, the Big Five variable of openness has been conceptualized as 
relating to perceptions of creativity (e.g., Feist, 1998; McCrae, 1987), though other 
studies implicate other traits (e.g., Feist, 1991).   
The Self-Monitoring scale consisted of 13 items measured on a 7-point scale (0= 
Strongly disagree; 6= Strongly agree).  There were two validated subscales: ability to 
modify self-presentation (7 items) and sensitivity to the expressive behavior of others (6 
items). For the first subscale, higher scores reflected a greater willingness to change 
one’s personality in different circumstances.  For the latter, higher scores indicated a 
greater ability to ‘read’ others and intuit social cues.  An example item was the 
following: “I have found that I can adjust my behavior to suit different people and 
different situations.” A full listing of items can be found in Appendix L.   
The Self-pluralism scale was measured on a 10-item dichotomous response 
inventory (1=True, -1=False), where higher scores indicated more perceived variance in 
personality. Final scores reflected a sum of the items, with a balanced score being zero.  
An example item was the following: “Sometimes I feel like two (or more) persons 
under the same skin.” A full listing of items can be found in Appendix K. Self-
Pluralism has not typically been compared to creative performance, so there is scant 
literature on the topic.  However, self-pluralism in initial studies had a moderate 
relationship with self-monitoring (r = .40), and, like the PCS, it conveys the idea of a 
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wide-ranging personality (McReynolds et al., 2000).  In this sense, those high in self-
pluralism may perceive their personality as varying more and, thereby, allowing greater 
creative performance. 
To compare the PCS to other self-report measures of creativity and intelligence, 
a second regression was initialized. The Creative Personality Scale (CPS; Gough, 
1979), the Need for Cognition scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1984) and Self-theories of 
Intelligence scale (Dweck, 2000) were utilized to see how PCS contributed over and 
above other measures of self-reported creativity. 
 The Creative Personality Scale (CPS) is an adjective check list of traits thought 
to be associated with creativity.  The CPS was measured on a 30-item dichotomous 
response inventory (either checking an adjective or not), where higher scores indicated 
greater perceived creative self-efficacy. A full listing of adjectives is detailed in 
Appendix P. In Dollinger, Urban, and James’ (2004) study, it was strongly correlated (r 
= .55) with Openness and particularly visual creativity, such as art.  McCrae’s (1987) 
results found the CPS was associated with divergent thinking tasks of creativity.  It is a 
prominent scale for perceptions of creativity (Dollinger, Urban, & James, 2004), even 
more predictive than that of the Creative Behavior inventory (Hocevar, 1981); however, 
correlations appear to be modest in some cases or non-significant in others.  
Need for Cognition has also been implicated as a correlate in extant creativity 
studies.  Need for Cognition was measured using an 18-item inventory (-4= very strong 
disagreement, +4=very strong agreement), where higher scores indicated a greater 
desire to think and be challenged cognitively. An example item was the following: “I 
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really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.” A full 
listing of items can be found in Appendix N.   
I included Dweck’s (2000) Self-theories of Intelligence scale to directly assess if 
it was associated with creative performance with a self-theory scale.  Self-theories of 
Intelligence were measured with 8 items on a 6-point scale (1=strongly disagree; 6= 
strongly agree.)  Higher scores indicated a more concrete, rather than fluid, definition of 
intelligence and cognition—it is less likely to change.  An example item was the 
following: “To be honest, you can’t really change how intelligent you are.” A full 
listing can be found in Appendix O.   
Alternative Uses Task.  Next, the participants engaged in the alternative uses 
task (e.g., Guilford, 1967)—a divergent thinking task validated as an indicator of 
creative potential (Runco & Acar, 2012).  In a 10-minute timed task, the participants 
were asked to report as many creative uses as they could for an empty soda bottle (for 
exact instructions, see Appendix Q).   
Participants’ responses were later coded by three trained research assistants to 
assess creative performance on the task using four metrics.  An individual’s Fluency 
was the total number of responses.  For each response, individuals were awarded 1 
point.  Three other measures of creativity were also assessed: Originality, Flexibility, 
and Elaboration.   
Originality was scored by comparing each response to other responses from all 
participants.  Responses that were given by 4% of participants or fewer were counted as 
unusual, granting 1 point.  Responses that are given by less than 1% of participants 
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were considered unique and awarded 2 points.  Fluency often influences Originality - 
having more responses will likely grant more originality points.  To control for this 
contamination, Originality scores were divided by an individual’s Fluency score (e.g., 
Hocevar, 1979; Shah et al., 2012). 
Flexibility was defined as the number of categories used. For example, one 
individual might offer categories where a soda bottle is used as a weapon, building-
block, musical instrument, and an art piece.  For each category, the participant earned 1 
point.  However, if the participant reported two or more examples where a soda bottle 
was used as a weapon, they would receive no further points beyond the first.  
Elaboration, defined as level of detail, was also rated by these coders. For each 
response, the coder rated how detailed the alternative use was.  Merely defining the use 
earned no Elaboration points (an art piece).  Identifying contextual information 
increased Elaboration by one point (an art piece at an Urban Art Exhibit).  A highly 
specific response about the use also increased Elaboration by one point (a nose on a 
Mickey Mouse sculpture).  Participants could receive a maximum of two points for each 
response, if they included both elements (a nose on a Mickey Mouse sculpture at an 
Urban Art Exhibit). 
3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Gender 
Several independent sample t-tests assessed potential gender differences.  There 
was no significant difference between males (M = 3.84, SD = 1.07) and females (M = 
4.06, SD = 1.32) in perceived personality consistency, t(201)= 1.28, p = .20.   For 
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creativity measures, we also found no significant difference in Fluency for males (M = 
14.98, SD = 5.87) and females (M = 15.09, SD = 5.86), t(201) = .11, p = .91.  Likewise, 
there was no significant difference between males (M = 6.95, SD = 2.03) and females 
(M = 6.99, SD = 2.08) in Flexibility measures, t(201) = .13, p = .90.  For Originality, 
males (M = 2.59, SD = .58) and females (M = 2.57, SD = .55) scored about the same, 
t(201) = .09, p = .93.  Finally, Elaboration scores were about equivalent between men 
(M = 1.02, SD = 1.46) and women (M = 1.23, SD = 1.46), t(201) = .95, p = .35.  
Overall, consistent with predictions, there were no significant effects of gender which 
might affect primary analyses. 
3.4.2 Descriptive Statistics  
A full listing of descriptive statistics and Cronbach’s alphas can be found in 
Table 5.  In short, all predictors in Study 2 met criteria for acceptable internal 
consistency.  The Mini-IPIP scales, some of which were questionable in Study 1, were 
internally consistent in Study 2. 
3.4.3 PCS 
Similar to Study 1, PCS was internally consistent (α = .83).  Inter-item 
correlations for the PCS can be found in Table 6.  Overall, the PCS performed well by 
Clark and Watson’s (1995) standards, reaching an average inter-item consistency of .54.  
This fell slightly above the recommended range (.40 to .50) for specific constructs in 
scale development. Correlations between the PCS and all continuous variables are 
reported in Table 7.  For PCS specifically, I applied a Bonferroni correction to control 
for family-wise error. As in Study 1, PCS scores were associated with the HEXACO 
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(r(201)= .32, p < .001), presence of meaning (r(201)= .30, p < .001), authenticity 
(r(202) = .50, p < .001), and indecision (r(201) = -.36, p < .001).  However, searching 
for meaning failed to meet this criterion, r(201) = -.12, p = .08. 
Contrary to my predictions and those of Study 1, the Big Five Inventory (BFI-2) 
did predict PCS scores.  Zero-order correlations found a positive relationship with 
extraversion, r(201) = .36, p < .01.  As such, higher extraversion predicted greater self-
perceived consistency in personality.  There was also a positive relationship with 
conscientiousness, r(201) = .28, p < .01.  Higher conscientiousness scores predicted 
greater perceived personality consistency.  Neuroticism was negatively associated with 
PCS scores, r(201) = -.38, p < .01; in essence, neuroticism predicted less perceived 
personality consistency.  Agreeableness was also positively related to PCS, r(201) = 
.30, p < .01, such that higher agreeableness predicted higher perceived personality 
consistency.  Of note, Openness was unrelated to PCS scores, r(201) = .03, p = .72. 
Utilizing a multiple regression with all Big Five measures as predictors and PCS 
as an outcome found similar results.  Between the five predictors, only Extraversion (b 
= .51, t(197) = 4.12, p < .01) and Agreeableness (b = .40, t(197) = 2.68, p < .01) were 
significant by our Bonferroni correction criterion (p < .01).  Neuroticism was 
marginally significant (b = -.25, t(197) = -2.37, p =.02).  Conscientiousness (b = .26, 
t(197) = 1.91, p =.06) and Openness (b = -.19, t(197) = -1.60, p =.11) were non-
significant. 
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3.4.4 Predictive Validity 
Alternative Uses Task.  The descriptive statistics for creativity performance are 
reported in Table 4.  Each participant was scored on four different metrics of creativity: 
Fluency, Flexibility, Elaboration, and Originality.  For the former three measures, three 
coders determined an initial score for each participant.  Using the irr library in R 
(Gamer, Lemon, Fellows & Singh, 2012), interrater reliability was calculated by using 
single-score intra-class correlation (ICC).  A simple F-test was conducted to assess 
whether interrater reliability was significantly different from 0.  Agreement was also 
calculated, noting percentage-wise how often coders’ scores fell within 1 point of each 
other.  For Fluency, initial scoring was highly reliable with an ICC of .97, F(202, 62.4) 
= 109.00, p < .001.  All three coders were within 1 point of each other for about 74% of 
participants.  For ideas in which two or more coders believed the alternative use did not 
follow directions (either by being non-sensical or being a standard use), that idea was 
removed from future analyses. 201 ideas were removed (about 6%), leaving 3,004 ideas 
in total across 203 participants.   
For Flexibility, initial scoring was highly reliable with an ICC of .80, 
F(202,363) = 13.30, p < .001.  The coders were within 1 point of each other for about 
59% of participants. For Elaboration, initial scoring was fairly reliable with an ICC of 
.59, F(202, 62.4) = 109.00, p < .001.  All three coders were within 1 point of each other 
for about 76% of participants.  These metrics indicated good to excellent interrater 
reliability as per Cicchetti’s (1994) standards.  Next, coders met to reach consensus on 
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any participants in which they disagreed—scores were updated, resulting in one score 
for each creativity metric. 
Originality was calculated differently.  It was measured by frequency; 
conceptually identical uses were grouped by a single trained research assistant.  For 
example, “noisemaker” was grouped with “maracas,” “morrocas [sic],” and “if filled up 
with tiny pebbles could be morrocos a musical intrument [sic]”, among others, as all 
make noise upon shaking them.  These groupings differ strictly from Flexibility 
categories in that they are conceptually identical, not just similar.  Participant 
information was removed and alternative uses randomized, so the research assistant was 
not influenced by order.  The research assistant’s work resulted in 44 different 
categories, which are fully detailed in Table 8.  Within these 44 categories, there were 
3,004 ideas in total.  For each alternative use, participants received one point for the 
idea if its category fell below 120 mentions for all participants (about 4% of ideas). If 
their idea was in a category below 32 mentions (about 1%), participants received two 
points for the idea.  Summing the points received for each idea and dividing them by the 
individual’s Fluency score resulted in a participant’s Originality score. 
After coding, results indicated the typical participant offered about 15 valid 
alternative uses in 10 minutes, though scores varied widely (M = 15.05, SD = 5.85).  In 
general, each participant gave solutions from 7 different categories (M = 6.98, SD = 
2.06).  Participants received about 5 points on average for original responses with a 
large spread (M = 4.97, SD = 2.71)—controlling for Fluency diminished these scores 
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considerably (M = .33, SD = .18). Elaboration was positively skewed, such that many 
participants scored low with outliers influencing the distribution (M = 1.17, SD = 1.51). 
Correlation analyses were conducted between PCS measures and the four 
creativity facets post-consensus: Fluency, Originality, Flexibility, and Elaboration.  
Consistent with predictions, Flexibility was associated with PCS, r(201) = -.21, p < 
.001, such that as perceived personality consistency scores decreased, Flexibility 
performance on the task increased.  PCS was unassociated with Fluency, r(201) = .01, p 
= .99, Originality, r(201) = .05, p = .48, and Elaboration, r(201) = .11, p = .11.  As such, 
for incremental validity of the PCS, we focused on Flexibility as an outcome measure.  
In sum, this partially supported my initial hypothesis that the PCS predicted creative 
performance, but especially Flexibility.  However, the PCS did not predict Originality 
scores. 
3.4.5 Incremental Validity 
Next, I examined the incremental validity of the PCS, in predicting above other 
conceptually related variables. Table 7 contains a correlation matrix with all predictors. 
Creativity. Overall, typical measures of creativity did not seem to correlate well 
with Flexibility.  The CPS was unassociated with Flexibility, r(201) = .07, p = .32.  
Need for Cognition, similarly, was unrelated, r(201) = .10, p = .15.  Self-theories of 
intelligence also appeared unrelated to Flexibility, though it bordered on marginal, 
r(201) = .11 , p = .12.  Since they did not relate to the outcome measures, these 
variables were discarded from final models. 
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Personality. Self-pluralism was significantly correlated with Flexibility scores, 
r(201) = .16, p < .01.  Neither ability to adapt presentation (r(201)= .06, p = .40) nor 
sensitivity to the expressive behavior of others (r(201) = -.07, p = .32) were associated 
with Flexibility performance.  Interestingly, the Big Five Inventory’s open-mindedness 
metric (r(201) = .18, p < .01), but not the mini-IPIP’s Intellect score (r(201) = .06, p = 
.40), was associated with Flexibility.  Overall, since self-pluralism and BFI-openness 
were positively related to Flexibility performance, I included them with PCS in 
incremental validity models. 
Full model. In order to measure the impact of PCS on Flexibility, forced 
stepwise linear models were created (for a step-by-step approach: Haynes & Lench, 
2003).  Results from these models and the change in variance explained are reported in 
Table 9.  The initial model included both BFI-openness scores and self-pluralism as 
predictors.  The second added the PCS. The first model was overall significant, F(2, 
200) = 6.11, p < .001, with both BFI-openness (b = .54, t(200) = 2.55, p = .01) and self-
pluralism (b = .61, t(200) = 2.38, p = .02) positively predicted Flexibility, controlling 
for each other.  The percentage of variance explained (R2) by the model was about 6%. 
Similarly, the full model with all three predictors was significant, F(3, 199) = 
5.70, p < .001.  BFI-openness significantly predicted Flexibility (b = .56, t (199) = 2.66, 
p < .01), controlling for the other two variables.  The PCS also significantly predicted 
Flexibility (b = -.34, t(199) = -2.16, p < .05), controlling for the other two variables. 
However, self-pluralism became a non-significant factor (b = .08, t(199) = .22, p = .82), 
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partialling out effects of the other variables.  The percentage of variance explained (R2) 
by the model was about 8%. 
Analysis of R2 –change assessed whether the models were significantly different 
from each other in predictivity.  The change in variance explained between the two 
models was significantly different, ΔR = .04, F(1, 199) = 4.66, p < .05. The full model 
(R2 = .08) explained significantly more variance than the initial model (R2 = .06).  This 
also suggested that PCS, as well as openness to experience, contributed to the prediction 
of Flexibility performance, despite controlling for other existing significant predictors. 
In sum, this evidence supported initial hypotheses that the PCS could predict 
creative performance above that of pre-existing measures. 
3.5 Discussion 
Study 2 contributed to several key objectives.  First, it replicated and solidified 
several findings of Study 1, strengthening construct validity.  Perceived personality 
consistency again correlated with presence of meaning in life (+), authenticity (+), and 
indecision (-).  Though the relationship with searching for meaning in life did not 
replicate, it was marginally significant.  Second, Study 2 supported predictive validity, 
creating a link between the PCS and creative performance.  Specifically, Flexibility, a 
process measure of creativity, correlated with performance on a prominent divergent 
thinking task.  Third, Study 2 addressed incremental validity concerns.  It contributed 
above that of the Self-Pluralism scale and in conjunction with the Big Five measure of 
openness to experience to predict Flexibility scores.  This provides evidence that while 
perceived personality consistency is functionally distinct from openness, it overlaps and 
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outperforms the Self-Pluralism scale on creativity flexibility.  The PCS explains more 
variance in half the number of items, suggesting the measure is incrementally valid. 
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4. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 The goal of the present investigation was to develop a scale to measure 
perceived personality consistency.  These two studies, taken together, (1) resulted in 
development of an individual difference measure of perceived personality consistency, 
assessing the psychometric properties of the measure, (2) explored the association 
between perceived personality consistency and creative performance, and (3) assessed 
how the new personality consistency measure compares to extant measures.  Study 1 
involved initial scale development of perceived personality consistency between 
contexts.  The five-item measure was internally consistent via factor analysis and 
Cronbach’s alpha. As expected, the construct had considerable convergent and 
divergent validity-- authenticity, meaning in life, and indecision were associated with 
this variable, while personality traits were not strongly tied to it. Study 2 replicated 
many of these findings and added a creative performance task; perceived personality 
consistency negatively correlated with Flexibility creativity performance scores—those 
with greater perceived consistency often reported fewer idea categories.  This supported 
the predictive validity of the PCS.  Finally, the PCS appeared to be incrementally valid 
as a predictor of Flexibility. In conjunction with the openness to experience personality 
variable, it contributed to variance accounted for above that attributed to Self-pluralism 
or other measures of personality variability.  Despite having fewer items than the Self-
Pluralism scale, the PCS performed better. 
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4.1 The PCS and Flexibility   
The PCS appears only to be a predictor of Flexibility scores on the alternative 
uses task.  It did not significantly associate with Fluency, Originality, or Elaboration in 
Study 2.  Initial hypotheses supported only modest effects for creativity, but the 
findings suggest no relation.  However, these results make sense, considering how these 
creativity metrics are conceptualized.  Flexibility is often considered a variable 
assessing the creative process: a measure of how broadly the design space—here, a 
cognitive landscape of potentially effective ideas—has been explored for a solution 
(e.g., Shah, Millsap, Woodward, & Smith, 2012).  While Fluency may reflect a large 
amount of ideas with superficial deviations, Flexibility reflects greater conceptual 
variation in solutions.  In essence, to begin solving a problem, individuals generate 
ideas from different perspectives.  While Fluency and Flexibility are often highly 
correlated, as they were in this study (r = .65), they often show how differently certain 
individuals approach their problem-solving. 
Like Flexibility, low perceived personality consistency may also reflect 
variation—individuals potentially visualize themselves as different individuals under 
different circumstances.  A similar association was seen between Flexibility and the 
Self-Pluralism scale, where higher scores indicated greater variety of self-perspectives 
(McReynolds et al., 2000).  However, partialling out the variance of the PCS 
completely eliminated this effect, suggesting that the PCS is a stronger version of a 
similar construct.  The PCS does not, however, eliminate the effect of the BFI-2’s open-
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mindedness trait, suggesting that perceived personality consistency is functionally 
distinct from openness.  
4.2 Remaining Questions   
There were limitations to the study.  First, personality relationships were 
inconsistent between Study 1 and Study 2.  The overall pattern changed from barely any 
significant predictors for PCS to modest relationships with Extraversion and 
Agreeableness.  One explanation could be because of sampling bias or participant 
quality. Study 1 participants were collected at the end of a semester, just as people are 
rushed to earn course credit, while Study 2 was collected at the beginning. Measures of 
internal consistency were typically lower in quality, and the distributions varied less in 
Study 1.  However, central tendencies of personality also may be inconsistently 
associated with personality variability.  This may be complicated by perceived 
personality consistency’s relationship with divergent thinking tasks; even different 
scales measuring the same Big Five variables (i.e., BBF: Gosling, Rentfrow, & Swann, 
2003; NEO: Costa & McCrae, 1992; IPIP: Goldberg et al., 2006) have differed with 
respect to reaching significance within the same divergent thinking task sample (Silvia 
et al., 2008).   
Secondly, the PCS did not correlate with all measures of creativity, but this may 
be due to the structure of the task rather than a lack of association. This alternative uses 
task lasted ten minutes; this may have been too much time.  It is impossible to tell the 
speed to which each person reported ideas with the current data—perhaps Fluency and 
Originality would be better associated given a more stringent time limit.  A sprint 
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approach, rather than a marathon, might be useful here.  This method would benefit 
participants who could quickly generate a substantial quantity of ideas or reward those 
whom gave very novel ideas in a short period.  Elaboration may have also been harmed 
by the nature of a timed task.  Though most of the other measures were normally 
distributed, Elaboration was skewed right, exhibiting a floor effect.  Despite not framing 
the task as a competition, participants may have felt compelled to report a short solution 
then move on without wasting time.  Future studies should tease these issues out by 
modifying time limit—either by limiting it or removing it. 
Finally, the incremental models contained very few significant variables, despite 
predictions that many scales were conceptually related.  Specifically, the Creative 
Personality, Need for Cognition, and Self-Monitoring were not related to Flexibility 
scores on the alternative uses task.  Some of my results starkly contrast the literature; 
for example, in the original Self-Pluralism validation study (McReynolds et al., 2000), 
self-pluralism moderately correlated with self-monitoring (r = .41).  In this study, self-
pluralism was completely uncorrelated with either self-monitoring subscale.  This 
seemed to spread to Flexibility measures. The Need for Cognition scale has been 
moderately related (about r = .35) to performance on creative inventories and tasks 
(e.g., Dollinger, 2003; Hocevar, 1981); however, a similar study with the Rational-
Experiential Inventory’s (REI: Pacini & Epstein, 1999) rational thinking subscale, an 
adapted Need for Cognition scale, was non-significant on the four metrics.   
Though not all effects were this dramatic, I observed attenuation of predictors’ 
effects in the current work, relative to published studies. McCrae (1987) reported a 
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strong relationship between the CPS and Openness to Experience (r = .44).  Dollinger, 
Urban, and James (2004) reported a similarly strong effect decades later (r = .55).  
However, my study found only a moderate association between the two variables (BFI-
2: r = .38; Mini-IPIP: r = .28).  For specifically creativity, McCrae (1987) found that 
CPS was significantly related to several different divergent thinking tasks, but most 
effects were modest (typically around r = .20).  If this pattern of weakening can be 
extrapolated, it might explain the current study’s non-significance.   One explanation for 
these smaller effects relative to other studies might be political affiliation.  Dollinger 
(2007) noted that conservatism had a small but consistent negative relationship with 
creativity metrics, even controlling for verbal ability and openness to experience; since 
both samples were overwhelmingly Republican and consisted typically of Texas 
residents, this may have made relationships more diffuse.  Unfortunately, I did not 
include a validated scale of conservatism to verify. 
4.3 Conclusion 
Despite these limitations, this study package provided further evidence of an 
association between beliefs (perceived personality consistency) and reality (creative 
ability).  Past research has found some evidence that beliefs in one’s own creativity 
often correlates with performance (Furnham, Zhang, & Chamorro-Premuzic, 2006; 
Gong, Huang, & Farh, 2009).  This connection creates avenues for experimental work.  
Prior research has manipulated perceptions of the self via meta-cognitive accessibility 
in order to produce real changes in performance (e.g., Corby & Hama, 2011; Schwarz, 
1998; Schwarz et al., 1991).  Future research could explore ‘fooling’ individuals into 
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thinking they are more variable in personality—thereby, augmenting creative 
performance by changing their responses on the PCS.   
This approach is reminiscent of the growth mindset literature, where students are 
informed that intelligence is either fixed or able to grow; experimenters here manipulate 
beliefs, which produce real-world results.  For example, several studies have used this 
growth-mindset manipulation to improve mathematical performance (e.g., Dar-Nimrod 
& Heine, 2007).  Though it is only a belief, this mindset appears to impact neural 
effects on cognitive control (Schroder, Moran, Donnellan, & Moser, 2014).  Applied to 
the PCS, this experimental manipulation might prove useful for education; if 
researchers can influence students’ self-perceptions to help them become more creative, 
teachers may be able to utilize or adapt tasks for their own curriculum.  Practical 
applications could involve students exploring different approaches to idea generation or 
helping students with thinking from others’ (different) perspectives—a new form of 
diversity training. 
It is worth noting one consistent pattern of results between Study 1 and 2.  Low 
PCS scores were associated with less authenticity, potentially more neuroticism, and 
less presence of meaning in life.  Overall, having a greater perceived consistency in 
personality appeared to predict greater stability; however, this does not mean that 
having a diffuse sense of personality is a wholly negative experience.  In some 
circumstances, low perceived personality consistency can be functional—the current 
investigation has suggested creative flexibility may improve.  Despite a greater surety in 
a sense a self, a person believing themselves to be rigidly consistent personality may not 
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always benefit.  If they are unwilling or unable to change, their own beliefs may hinder 
them when the situation demands flexibility. Therefore, if this construct can be 
manipulated, it will be important to determine when belief in personality consistency is 
adaptive or not. 
The current findings constitute a next step in personality research.  Though 
researchers have explored personality as a predictor of creativity, they have often 
focused on Big Five measures.  Creativity researchers have suggested significant 
associations with several Big Five variables, but directions of effects have often been 
inconsistent.  For example, specifically in divergent thinking task performance, 
neuroticism has ranged between r = -.14 and r = .14, with some replications finding 
non-significant results (Kaufman et al., 2015; Lin et al., 2013; McCrae, 1987; Pickering, 
Smillie, & DeYoung, 2016; Silvia et al., 2009).  In response to these conflicting 
findings, researchers have taken issue with any single inventory predicting creativity 
performance or suggested continual replication (e.g., Dollinger, 2003; Feldhusen & 
Goh, 1995; Hocevar, 1981; Hocevar & Bachelor, 1989; Houtz & Krug, 1995).  The 
current findings reflected that the only consistently significant personality factor 
associated with creative performance was openness to experience; even then, effects 
were typically modest.  The current investigation suggests that a new factor should be 
considered in conjunction with this measure: perceived personality consistency.  
Though the PCS explained variance above that of existing personality variability scales, 
it was unrelated to openness to experience.  It appears both factors are useful to predict 
creative flexibility. 
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APPENDIX A 
TABLES 
Table 1. 
The Personality Consistency Scale (PCS) Items (Study 1) 
Note.  Items with a star (*) indicated a reverse scored item.  The item-total r column assesses 
the individual item’s correlation with all other items. 
Item Factor Item-total r 
1. I feel like my personality changes from situation
to situation.*
0.85 0.72 
2. In different situations, I am a very different
person.*
0.80 0.63 
3. In a social setting, I behave very differently than
I actually am.*
0.78 0.61 
4. How I behave depends on who I am around.* 0.71 0.51 
5. I try on personality traits like someone might try
on clothes: a trait for each occasion.*
0.62 0.42 
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Table 2. 
Descriptive Statistics of All Scales for Validation (Study 
1) Scale M SD α 
Attitude Consistency Items 4.25 0.84 0.72 
Authenticity Scale 4.90 0.96 0.87 
HEXACO - Flexibility Subscale 3.95 1.02 0.86 
MDMQ - Indecision Subscale 3.98 1.41 0.89 
Meaning in Life - Presence Subscale 4.67 1.31 0.89 
Meaning in Life - Searching Subscale 4.29 1.32 0.91 
Mini-IPIP: Agreeableness 5.02 1.15 0.74 
Mini-IPIP: Conscientiousness 4.32 1.16 0.70 
Mini-IPIP: Extraversion 4.20 1.44 0.79 
Mini-IPIP: Intellect 4.92 1.06 0.65 
Mini-IPIP: Neuroticism 3.60 1.02 0.56 
PCS 4.43 1.16 0.82 
Note. Most scales utilized in Study 1 performed well, with the exceptions of the Mini-IPIP’s 
Neuroticism and Intellect subscales.  As this is a shortened scale, future research should 
examine the full IPIP to offer a more consistent responses of personality traits. 
73 
Table 3. 
Inter-Item Correlations for PCS (Study 1) 
Item. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 
In different situations, I am a very different person. 1.00 
In a social setting, I behave very differently… .45** 1.00 
I feel like my personality changes from situation… .53** .50** 1.00 
How I behave depends on who I am around. .42** .34** .48** 1.00 
I try on personality traits like someone… .28** .39** .42** .24* 1.00 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01. Items fully listed in Table 1.  Average inter-item correlation is .41. 
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Table 4. 
Correlation Matrix (Study 1) 
Scale 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. PCS (.82)            
2. Attitude Consistency 0.31* (.72)           
3. Indecision -0.28* -0.36* (.89)          
4. Authenticity 0.48* 0.49* -0.31* (.87)         
5. HEXACO Flexibility -0.23* 0.03 0.16 -0.24* (.86)        
6. MILQ Presence 0.27* 0.26* -0.30* 0.41* -0.14 (.89)       
7. MILQ Searching -0.27* -0.19ε 0.22* -0.30* 0.13 -0.33* (.91)      
8. Intellect 0.13 0.05 -0.03 0.16 -0.12 0.17 -0.02 (.65)     
9. Conscientiousness 0.05 0.20 ε -0.46* 0.29* -0.03 0.24* -0.10 -0.01 (.70)    
10. Extraversion 0.16 0.09 -0.23* 0.12 0.00 0.20 -0.06 0.11 0.04 (.79)   
11. Agreeableness 0.10 0.10 -0.01 0.22* -0.24* 0.06 0.14 0.12 0.15 0.13 (.74)  
12. Neuroticism -0.30* -0.24* 0.29* -0.38* 0.31* -0.24* 0.28* -0.21* -0.26* -0.15 -0.02 (.56) 
Note. Cronbach’s alphas for scales are in parentheses.  
 ε p < .10.  
* p < .05.   
MILQ  = Meaning in Life Questionnaire.
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Table 5. 
Descriptive Statistics and Cronbach’s alpha for scales (Study 2) 
Note. BFI: Big Five Inventory.  For alpha, scores above .70 are considered good, above .80 is 
considered to be great, and above .90 is considered to be excellent (DeVellis, 2012).   
 
  
Scale M SD α 
Authenticity Scale 5.17 .99 0.87 
BFI Agreeableness 3.81 .58 0.78 
BFI Conscientious 3.70 .63 0.83 
BFI Extraversion 3.55 .68 0.84 
BFI Neuroticism 2.79 .85 0.89 
BFI Openness 3.56 .67 0.83 
Decisional Procrastination 3.67 1.37 0.85 
HEXACO Flexibility 4.12 .99 0.81 
Meaning in Life Presence 4.86 1.45 0.90 
Meaning in Life Searching 4.54 1.59 0.90 
Mini-IPIP Agreeableness 5.63 1.03 0.77 
Mini-IPIP Conscientiousness 4.78 1.24 0.75 
Mini-IPIP Extraversion 4.32 1.49 0.85 
Mini-IPIP Neuroticism 3.65 1.29 0.71 
Mini-IPIP Openness to Experience 4.50 .84 0.78 
Need for Cognition 5.39 1.22 0.90 
Personality Consistency Scale 4.00 1.25 0.86 
Self Monitoring - Modify Self-Presentation 4.98 .95 0.79 
Self Monitoring –Expressive Behavior 5.07 1.06 0.80 
Self Pluralism Scale -.35 .55 0.81 
Self-theories of Intelligence 2.73 .83 0.77 
Fluency – Number of Ideas 15.05 5.85 - 
Flexibility – Number of Categories 6.98 2.06 - 
Originality – Novelty per Idea .33 .18 - 
Elaboration – Detail of Ideas 1.17 1.51 - 
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Table 6. 
Inter-Item Correlations for PCS (Study 2) 
Item. 1 2 3 4 5 
In different situations, I am… 1        
In a social setting, I behave... .57** 1    
I feel like my personality changes from… .71** .64** 1   
How I behave depends… .57** .48** .52** 1  
I try on personality traits like someone… .42** .55** .56** .44** 1 
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01. Items fully listed in Table 1. Average inter-item correlation is .54.  
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Table 7. 
Correlation Matrix, Study 2 
Scale 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. PCS 0.32** -0.12 0.30** 0.50** -0.36** -0.70** 0.09 -0.05 0.09 0.32** 0.19* 0.01 
2. HEXACO  -0.25** 0.30** 0.28** -0.33** -0.32** 0.11 -0.05 0.05 0.1 0.16* 0.02 
3. MIL_S   -0.29** -0.21** 0.23** 0.12 0.02 -0.08 -0.05 -0.06 -0.07 0.21** 
4. MIL_P    0.56** -0.28** -0.40** 0.11 -0.02 0.28** 0.25** 0.23** -0.03 
5. Authenticity     -0.50** -0.52** 0.27** -0.20** 0.27** 0.24** 0.28** 0.02 
6. DP      0.33** -0.34** 0.07 -0.17* -0.04 -0.36** -0.08 
7. SPS       -0.06 0.22** -0.19** -0.27** -0.27** 0.11 
8. NFC        -0.04 0.25** 0.01 0.1 0.37** 
9. STInt         0.1 0.02 -0.01 0.12 
10. CPS          0.39** -0.05 0.28** 
11. MI_E           -0.05 0.11 
12. MI_C            0.02 
13. MI_I             
14. MI_N             
15. MI_A             
16. BFI_E             
17. BFI_C             
18. BFI_O             
19. BFI_N             
20. BFI_A             
21. SMS_SP             
22. SMS_XB             
23. Fluency             
24. Flexibility             
25. Elaboration             
26. Originality             
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Table 7 Continued. 
Note: * p < .05; ** p < .01. PCS = Personality Consistency Scale; MIL = Meaning in Life (searching and presence); DP = Decisional Procrastination Scale; SPS = Self Pluralism Scale; 
NFC = Need for Cognition; STInt = Self-theories of Intelligence; CPS = Creative Personality Scale; MI = Mini-IPIP (extraversion, conscientiousness, intelligence, neuroticism, 
agreeableness); BFI = Big Five Inventory (extraversion, conscientiousness, openness, neuroticism, agreeableness); SMS = Self-monitoring (ability to modify self-presentation, sensitivity to 
expressive behavior of others).  
Scale  14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
1. PCS -0.32** 0.26** 0.36** 0.28** 0.03 -0.37** 0.30** -0.07 0.08 0.00 -0.21** 0.11 0.05 
2. HEXACO -0.45** 0.30** 0.11 0.19** 0.20** -0.49** 0.58** 0.05 -0.08 -0.01 0.05 -0.01 0.09 
3. MIL_S 0.21** 0.05 -0.19** -0.14* 0.07 0.26** -0.10 0.02 0.17 0.02 -0.08 -0.1 -0.03 
4. MIL_P -0.38** 0.15* 0.42** 0.33** 0.11 -0.51** 0.32** 0.23** 0.13 -0.07 -0.12 0.00 -0.07 
5. Authenticity -0.47** 0.08 0.47** 0.44** 0.18* -0.60** 0.25** 0.09 0.12 -0.06 -0.17* 0.05 -0.03 
6. DP 0.29** -0.11 -0.21** -0.48** -0.22** 0.38** -0.15* -0.12 -0.11 -0.04 -0.01 -0.11 -0.02 
7. SPS 0.47** -0.09 -0.33** -0.35** 0.01 0.52** -0.36** 0.01 0.01 0.07 0.16* -0.04 0.05 
8. NFC -0.07 0.09 0.13 0.21** 0.59** -0.16* 0.11 0.07 0.17* 0.14* 0.10 0.14* -0.11 
9. STInt 0.12 -0.10 -0.01 -0.01 0.05 0.13 -0.18* 0.07 -0.02 0.11 0.11 0.03 0.11 
10. CPS -0.19** -0.10 0.45** 0.06 0.38** -0.29** -0.06 0.18* 0.14* 0.11 0.07 0.08 -0.06 
11. MI_E -0.18* 0.17* 0.73** -0.03 0.16* -0.23** 0.07 0.28** 0.16* 0.04 -0.04 0.10 0.04 
12. MI_C -0.21** 0.12 0.02 0.76** 0.01 -0.20** 0.24** 0.08 0.02 -0.13 -0.15* 0.02 -0.04 
13. MI_O 0.11 0.10 0.07 -0.06 0.58** 0.09 -0.01 0.05 0.11 0.17 0.06 0.00 -0.04 
14. MI_N 
 
0.01 -0.27** -0.29** -0.08 0.82** -0.36** -0.05 -0.01 0.04 -0.05 -0.05 -0.02 
15. MI_A 
 
 0.15* 0.19** 0.15* 0.05 0.49** 0.05 0.27** 0.04 -0.03 0.08 -0.07 
16. BFI_E 
 
  0.13 0.23** -0.36** 0.13 0.30** 0.24** 0.01 -0.06 0.12 0.01 
17. BFI_C 
  
  0.07 -0.34** 0.34** 0.09 0.15* -0.1 -0.12 0.03 0.00 
18. BFI_O 
  
   -0.13 0.19** 0.16* 0.23** 0.29** 0.18* 0.15* -0.06 
19. BFI_N 
  
    -0.35** -0.13* 0.00 0.03 -0.01 -0.03 -0.02 
20. BFI_A 
  
     0.02 0.00 -0.07 -0.01 -0.11 -0.02 
21. SMS_SP 
  
      0.44** 0.07 0.06 0.14* 0.04 
22. SMS_XB 
  
       0.08 -0.07 0.18* -0.04 
23. Fluency 
  
        0.65** 0.18* 0.12 
24. Flexibility 
  
         0.06 0.20** 
25. Elaboration 
  
          0.21** 
26. Originality 
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Table 8. 
Creativity Task Norms (Study 2) 
Category Frequency Percent Cumulative Awarded Examples 
Container 571 19.01% 19.01% 0 A bottle that contains things, like coins or shampoo 
Plant and Animal Houses 283 9.42% 28.43% 0 A bottle made into a terrarium or home for insects 
Instrument or Noisemaker 253 8.42% 36.85% 0 A percussion, woodwind, or rhythmic instrument 
Sports or Games 240 7.99% 44.84% 0 Used for games like football or soccer 
Crafts 186 6.19% 51.03% 0 Modified into something different like jewelry 
Artwork or decoration 185 6.16% 57.19% 0 
As part of an art exhibit or integrated into similar artistic 
works 
Toy 176 5.86% 63.05% 0 Toys for children, like a pretend gun or a spaceship 
Weapon 156 5.19% 68.24% 0 The primary use is to harm, injure, or break something 
Tool 129 4.29% 72.54% 0 Helps the person perform a task: hammer, shovel, or a blade 
Weight 106 3.53% 76.07% 1 Used as a paperweight, door prop 
Science 104 3.46% 79.53% 1 Utilized in science, like a flask 
Waste Disposal 81 2.70% 82.22% 1 Used to dispose of human waste or trash 
Communication 66 2.20% 84.42% 1 Sending a message, either written or spoken. 
Floatation 55 1.83% 86.25% 1 Used to buoy, like for a boat or fishing bob 
Chew Toy 51 1.70% 87.95% 1 Used as a chew toy for a pet 
Target 49 1.63% 89.58% 1 Used as targets for firearm or throwing practice 
Sprinkler or Filter 43 1.43% 91.01% 1 
Used to filter water or another liquid through by punching 
holes 
Cooking 39 1.30% 92.31% 1 
Used as cooking implements like a rolling pin or cookie 
cutter 
Dishware 33 1.10% 93.41% 1 Converting the bottle into a cup or dish 
Pretend Prop 33 1.10% 94.51% 1 Used in theater productions or assisting in hypotheticals 
Lighting 31 1.03% 95.54% 2 Lanterns and flashlights 
Speaker 25 0.83% 96.37% 2 Megaphones or microphones 
Lava Lamp 14 0.47% 96.84% 2 Creating a functioning lava lamp 
Lense or Magnifying Glass 14 0.47% 97.30% 2 Magnification, distortion, or coloring a view 
Wheels 10 0.33% 97.64% 2 Used as wheels for stockcars or other creations 
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Table 8 Continued.      
Category Frequency Percent Cumulative Awarded Examples 
Timer 9 0.30% 97.94% 2 Putting sand in it could create an hourglass 
Firestarter 9 0.30% 98.24% 2 Using it for survival and fire creation in the wild 
Trap 8 0.27% 98.50% 2 Using it to trap animals or insects with bait 
Prank or Scare 8 0.27% 98.77% 2 Coopted into a trap designed to embarrass someone 
Suction Cup 7 0.23% 99.00% 2 Used to create some means of suction; separating egg yolks 
Smoking 4 0.13% 99.13% 2 Converting the bottle into drug paraphernalia 
Alarm 4 0.13% 99.27% 2 
Used as a makeshift security system (knocking over, trip 
wires) 
Squeezer 3 0.10% 99.37% 2 Slight adjustments can allow it to squeeze things like ketchup 
Shoe Shaper 3 0.10% 99.47% 2 Bottle can be inserted to prevent shoes from flattening 
Time Capsule 3 0.10% 99.57% 2 Contains important memories to be shared at a later date 
Emergency 2 0.07% 99.63% 2 Traffic cones for road or when a car breaks down 
Cheating 2 0.07% 99.70% 2 Used to cheat on an exam as an innocuous object 
Sundial 2 0.07% 99.77% 2 Used as a pointer in a sundial in order to tell the real time 
Educational Product 2 0.07% 99.83% 2 Helping students learn or as a topic of a psychology study 
Shades 1 0.03% 99.87% 2 Using the label in order to shield or dim light on one's eyes 
Lifting 1 0.03% 99.90% 2 Placing it on its side and allowing it to roll or as a fulcrum 
Impact Reducer 1 0.03% 99.93% 2 Used to blunt the force of trauma, as shock absorbers might 
Trophy 1 0.03% 99.97% 2 Converted into an award of some sort for a competition 
Sex toy 1 0.03% 100.00% 2 Utilized sexually or as part of an adult fantasy 
Note. There were 3,004 ideas in sum between 44 different categories judged by research assistants. Frequency indicated how often an idea of a 
particular category occurred.  Lines separated points awarded (0, 1, or 2).  
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Table 9. 
Results for Incremental Validity Analysis 
 B SE β t p R2 
Flexibility (initial)      .06** 
   Openness .54 .21 .18 2.55* <.01  
   Self-pluralism .61 .26 .16 2.37* .01  
Flexibility (full)      .08** 
   Openness .56 .21 .18 2.66** <.01  
   Self-pluralism .08 .36 .02 .22 .83  
   PCS -.34 .16 -.20 -2.16* .03  
Note. * p < .05, ** p < .01.   
The change in variance explained between the two models was significantly different, ΔR = .04, F(1, 199) = 4.66, p < .05.  
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APPENDIX B 
FIRST DRAFT OF THE PERSONALITY CONSISTENCY SCALE 
 
 
Instructions: The following survey will ask you about your personality under different 
circumstances.  People may vary in consistency across situations and across time.  For 
each item below, indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement 
regarding your own personality. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
 
 
General Traits - Consistency across Short Term 
1. Over the past year, my personality has not changed much. 
2. Over the past year, my personality has changed significantly.* 
3. About a year ago, I held the same beliefs I have now. 
4. About a year ago, I behaved the same way that I do now. 
5. About a year ago, I thought similarly to how I do now. 
6. My personality has been the same all my life. 
General Traits - Belief in Personality Resilience 
1. My personality is very fluid.* 
2. When I need to change who I am to fit the situation, it takes a lot of effort for me to 
do so. 
3. I am comfortable acting differently than how I actually am.* 
4. I’m always myself regardless of who I am around. 
5. When I need to change who I am to fit the situation, it takes little effort.* 
6. It is difficult for me to act in a way inconsistent with my personality. 
General Traits - Consistency between Contexts 
1. In different situations, I am a very different person.* 
2. In a social setting, I behave very differently than I actually am.* 
3. I feel like my personality changes from situation to situation.* 
4. When I am outside my comfort zone, I adapt quickly without much effort.* 
 
 
83 
 
5. How I behave depends on who I am around.* 
6. When I am outside my comfort zone, I do not change how I act at all. 
7. I try on personality traits like someone might try on clothes: a trait for each 
occasion.* 
Specific Traits – Consistency across Lifetime 
1. Across my lifetime, I have always been as reserved or outgoing as I am today. 
2. Across my lifetime, I have always been as social or non-social as I am today. 
3. Across my lifetime, I have always been as careful or unconcerned as I am today 
4. Across my lifetime, I have always been as hardworking or lazy as I am today 
5. Across my lifetime, I have always been as friendly or unfriendly as I am today. 
6. Across my lifetime, I have always been as polite or blunt as I am today. 
7. Across my lifetime, I have always been as unstable or stable as I am today. 
8. Across my lifetime, I have always been as anxious or calm as I am today. 
9. Across my lifetime, I have always been as creative or uncreative as I am today.  
10. Across my lifetime, I have always been as open to new experiences or closed to new 
experiences as I am today.  
Note. *reverse scored   
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APPENDIX C 
HEXACO- FLEXIBILITY SUBSCALE (LEE & ASHTON, 2004) 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree  Strongly Agree 
 
1. I adjust easily. 
2. I am good at taking advice. 
3. When interacting with a group of people, I am often bothered by at least one of 
them.* 
4. I react strongly to criticism.* 
5. I get upset if others change the way I have arranged things.* 
6. I am hard to convince.* 
7. I am annoyed by others’ mistakes.* 
8. I can’t stand being contradicted.* 
9. I am hard to satisfy.* 
10. I am hard to reason with.* 
Note. *reverse scored 
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APPENDIX D 
MEANING IN LIFE SCALE (STEGER ET AL., 2006) 
 
 
 
Directions: Please take a moment to think about what makes your life and existence 
feel important and significant to you. Please respond to the following statements as 
truthfully and accurately as you can, and also please remember that these are very 
subjective questions and that there are no right or wrong answers.  
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Absolutely Untrue    Absolutely True 
 
1. I understand my life’s meaning.^  
2. I am looking for something that makes my life feel meaningful.+  
3. I am always looking to find my life’s purpose.+ 
4. My life has a clear sense of purpose.^  
5. I have a good sense of what makes my life meaningful.^  
6. I have discovered a satisfying life purpose.+ 
7. I am always searching for something that makes my life feel significant.^ 
8. I am seeking a purpose or mission for my life.^ 
9. My life has no clear purpose.*+ 
10. I am searching for meaning in my life. ^ 
Note. * reverse scored  
+ Presence of Meaning subscale  
^ Searching for Meaning subscale. 
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APPENDIX E 
AUTHENTICITY SCALE (WOOD ET AL., 2008) 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Does not describe me at all   Describes me very well 
 
1. I think it is better to be yourself than to be popular. 
2. I don’t know how I really feel inside.* 
3. I am strongly influenced by the opinions of others.* 
4. I usually do what other people tell me to do.* 
5. I always feel I need to do what others expect me to do.* 
6. Other people influence me greatly.* 
7. I feel as if I don’t know myself very well.* 
8. I always stand by what I believe in. 
9. I am true to myself in most situations. 
10. I feel out of touch with the ‘real me.’* 
11. I live in accordance with my values and beliefs. 
12. I feel alienated from myself.* 
Note. *reverse scored 
  
 
 
87 
 
APPENDIX F 
MELBOURNE DECISION MAKING QUESTIONNAIRE (MANN ET AL., 1997) – 
INDECISION SUBSCALE 
 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
 
 
1. I waste a lot of time on trivial matters before getting to the final decision. 
2. Even after I have made a decision, I delay acting upon it. 
3. When I have to make a decision, I wait for a long time before starting to think 
about it. 
4. I delay making decisions until it is too late. 
5. I put off making decisions. 
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APPENDIX G 
ATTITUDE CONSISTENCY ITEMS 
 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Strongly Disagree    Strongly Agree 
 
1. Others’ opinions often make me change my stance on an issue.* 
2. I often change what side I support on an issue depending on the context.* 
3. When viewing an argument, I can be convinced by either side. * 
4. I do not often change my mind. 
5. I am not likely to change my stance on an issue I care about. 
6. Small details can change my decisions on an issue.* 
7. How I react to a similar situations depends on the details.* 
8. Very little changes what I believe. 
 
Note. * reverse scored.  The Cronbach’s alpha for Study 1 was .72. 
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APPENDIX H 
MINI-IPIP (DONNELLAN ET AL., 2006) 
 
Instructions: On the following pages, there are phrases describing people's behaviors. 
Please use the rating scale below to describe how accurately each statement describes 
you. Describe yourself as you generally are now, not as you wish to be in the future. 
Describe yourself as you honestly see yourself, in relation to other people you know of 
the same sex as you are, and roughly your same age. So that you can describe yourself 
in an honest manner, your responses will be kept in absolute confidence. Please read 
each statement carefully, and then fill in the bubble that corresponds to the number on 
the scale. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Very Inaccurate     Very accurate 
 
1. Am the life of the party (E) 
2. Sympathize with others' feelings (A) 
3. Get chores done right away (C) 
4. Have frequent mood swings (N) 
5. Have a vivid imagination (I) 
6. Don't talk a lot (E) 
7. Am not interested in other people's problems (A) 
8. Often forget to put things back in their proper place (C) 
9. Am relaxed most of the time (N) 
10. Am not interested in abstract ideas (I) 
11. Talk to a lot of different people at parties (E) 
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12. Feel others' emotions (A) 
13. Like order (C) 
14. Get upset easily (N) 
15. Have difficulty understanding abstract ideas (I) 
16. Keep in the background (E) 
17. Am not really interested in others (A) 
18. Make a mess of things (C) 
19. Seldom feel blue (N) 
20. Do not have a good imagination (I) 
Note. (E) Extraversion; (A) Agreeableness; (C) Conscientiousness; (N) Neuroticism; (I) 
Intellect 
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APPENDIX I 
COOK’S D OUTLIER ANALYSIS – PARTICIPANT 30 AS OUTLIER IN CONSISTENCY BETWEEN CONTEXTS BY 
NEUROTICISM REGRESSION 
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APPENDIX J 
COOK’S D OUTLIER ANALYSIS – PARTICIPANTS 30, 43, 66, 69, AND 92 AS OUTLIERS IN CONSISTENCY 
BETWEEN CONTEXTS BY FIVE-FACTOR PERSONALITY TRAITS 
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APPENDIX K 
THE SELF-PLURALISM SCALE-10 (MCREYNOLDS, ALTROCCHI, & HOUSE, 
2000) 
 
 
Directions: Listed below are a number of statements concerning how you may see 
yourself.  Please read each item and decide whether the statement is True or False for 
you personally. 
1. T/F: I am the same kind of person every way, day in and day out. 
2. T/F*: People who know me well would say I act quite differently at different 
times. 
3. T/F: Though I vary somewhat from time to time, in general I always feel much 
the same. 
4. T/F: People who know me well would say I’m pretty predictable. 
5. T/F*: There have been times when I felt like a completely different person from 
what I was the day before. 
6. T/F: I act and feel essentially the same way whether at home, at work, or with 
friends. 
7. T/F*: I get along best when I act and feel like a totally different person at 
different times. 
8. T/F*: I sometimes have conflicts over whether to be one kind of person or a 
different kind. 
9.  T/F: I am the same sort of person regardless of whom I’m with. 
10. T/F*: People who know me would say that my behavior changes from situation 
to situation. 
 
Note. * reverse scored  
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APPENDIX L 
BIG FIVE INVENTORY – II – PERSONALITY TRAITS (BFI-2; SOTO & JOHN, 
2016) 
 
 
Directions: Here are a number of characteristics that may or may not apply to you. For 
example, do you agree that you are someone who likes to spend time with others? Please write a 
number next to each statement to indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with that 
statement. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
Disagree 
Strongly 
Disagree a 
little 
Neutral; no 
opinion 
Agree a little Agree 
Strongly 
 
Extraversion 
Sociability 
1. Is outgoing, sociable. 
46. Is talkative. 
16r. Tends to be quiet. 
31r. Is sometimes shy, introverted. 
 
Assertiveness 
6. Has an assertive personality. 
21. Is dominant, acts as a leader. 
36r. Finds it hard to influence people. 
51r. Prefers to have others take charge. 
 
Energy Level 
41. Is full of energy. 
56. Shows a lot of enthusiasm. 
11r. Rarely feels excited or eager. 
26r. Is less active than other people. 
 
Agreeableness 
Compassion 
2. Is compassionate, has a soft heart. 
32. Is helpful and unselfish with others. 
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17r. Feels little sympathy for others. 
47r. Can be cold and uncaring. 
 
Respectfulness 
7. Is respectful, treats others with respect. 
52. Is polite, courteous to others. 
22r. Starts arguments with others. 
37r. Is sometimes rude to others. 
 
Trust 
27. Has a forgiving nature. 
57. Assumes the best about people. 
12r. Tends to find fault with others. 
42r. Is suspicious of others’ intentions. 
 
Conscientiousness 
Organization 
18. Is systematic, likes to keep things in order. 
33. Keeps things neat and tidy. 
3r. Tends to be disorganized. 
48r. Leaves a mess, doesn’t clean up. 
 
Productiveness 
38. Is efficient, gets things done. 
53. Is persistent, works until the task is finished. 
8r. Tends to be lazy. 
23r. Has difficulty getting started on tasks. 
 
Responsibility 
13. Is dependable, steady. 
43. Is reliable, can always be counted on. 
28r. Can be somewhat careless. 
58r. Sometimes behaves irresponsibly. 
 
Negative Emotionality 
Anxiety 
19. Can be tense. 
34. Worries a lot. 
4r. Is relaxed, handles stress well. 
49r. Rarely feels anxious or afraid. 
 
Depression 
39. Often feels sad. 
54. Tends to feel depressed, blue. 
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9r. Stays optimistic after experiencing a setback. 
24r. Feels secure, comfortable with self. 
 
Emotional Volatility 
14. Is moody, has up and down mood swings. 
59. Is temperamental, gets emotional easily. 
29r. Is emotionally stable, not easily upset. 
44r. Keeps their emotions under control. 
 
Open-Mindedness 
Intellectual Curiosity 
10. Is curious about many different things. 
40. Is complex, a deep thinker. 
25r. Avoids intellectual, philosophical discussions. 
55r. Has little interest in abstract ideas. 
 
Aesthetic Sensitivity 
20. Is fascinated by art, music, or literature. 
35. Values art and beauty. 
5r. Has few artistic interests. 
50r. Thinks poetry and plays are boring. 
 
Creative Imagination 
15. Is inventive, finds clever ways to do things. 
60. Is original, comes up with new ideas. 
30r. Has little creativity. 
45r. Has difficulty imagining things.  
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APPENDIX M 
THE SELF-MONITORING SCALE (LENNOX, 1984) 
 
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 
Certainly, always false     Certainly, always true 
 
Ability to modify self-presentation 
1. In social situations, I have the ability to alter my behavior if I feel that 
something else is called for. 
2. I have the ability to control the way I come across to people, depending on the 
impression I want to give them. 
3. When I feel that the image I am portraying isn’t working, I can readily change it 
to something that does. 
4. I have trouble changing my behavior to suit different people and different 
situations.* 
5. I have found that I can adjust my behavior to meet the requirements of any 
situation I find myself in.  
6. Even when it might be to my advantage, I have difficulty putting up a good 
front.* 
7. Once I know what the situation calls for, it’s easy for me to regulate my actions 
accordingly. 
Sensitivity to expressive behavior of others 
1. I am often able to read people's true emotions correctly through their eyes.  
2. In conversations, I am sensitive to even the slightest change in the facial 
expression of the person I'm conversing with. 
3. My powers of intuition are quite good when it comes to understanding others' 
emotions and motives. 
4. I can usually tell when others consider a joke in bad taste, even though they may 
laugh convincingly. 
5. I can usually tell when I’ve said something inappropriate by reading it in the 
listener’s eyes. 
6. If someone is lying to me, I usually know it at once from that person’s manner 
of expression. 
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APPENDIX N 
NEED FOR COGNITION SCALE (CACIOPPO ET AL., 1984) 
 
Instructions: Please rate the extent to which you agree with each of 18 statements about the 
satisfaction you gain from thinking.  There is no right or wrong answer, so please answer as 
honestly as possible. 
+4 = very strong agreement 
+3 = strong agreement 
+2 = moderate agreement 
+1 = slight agreement 
  0 = neither agreement nor disagreement 
 -1 = slight disagreement 
 -2 = moderate disagreement 
 -3 = strong disagreement 
 -4 = very strong disagreement 
1. I would prefer complex to simple problems.  
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.  
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun.*  
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure to 
challenge my thinking abilities.*  
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is likely a chance I will have to think 
in depth about something.*  
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.  
7. I only think as hard as I have to.*  
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones.*  
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them.*  
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.  
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.  
12. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.*  
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.  
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.  
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is somewhat 
important but does not require much thought.  
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16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of mental 
effort.*  
17. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it works.*  
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me personally.  
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APPENDIX O 
THEORIES OF INTELLIGENCE SCALE (DWECK, 2000) 
 
Directions: The following questionnaire has been designed to investigate ideas about 
intelligence. There are no right or wrong answers. We are interested in your ideas. 
Using the scale below, please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with 
each of the following statements by writing the number that corresponds to your 
opinion in the space next to each statement. 
1 2 3 4 5 6 
Strongly Disagree     Strongly Agree  
______. You have a certain amount of intelligence, and you can’t really do much to change it.  
______. Your intelligence is something about you that you can’t change very much.  
______. No matter who you are, you can significantly change your intelligence level.*  
______. To be honest, you can’t really change how intelligent you are.  
______. You can always substantially change how intelligent you are. * 
______. You can learn new things, but you can’t really change your basic intelligence.*  
______. No matter how much intelligence you have, you can always change it quite a bit.*  
______. You can change even your basic intelligence level considerably.* 
Note. *reverse scored  
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APPENDIX P 
CREATIVE PERSONALITY SCALE (GOUGH, 1979) 
 
Directions: Please indicate which of the following adjectives best describe yourself.   
Check all that apply. 
 
___+___  Capable ___-___  Honest 
___-___  Artificial ___+___  Intelligent 
___+___  Clever ___-___  Well-mannered 
___-___  Cautious ___+___  Wide interests 
___+___  Confident ___+___  Inventive 
___+___  Egotistical ___+___  Original 
___-___  Commonplace ___-___  Narrow interests 
___+___  Humorous ___+___  Reflective 
___-___  Conservative ___-___  Sincere 
___+___  Individualistic ___+___  Resourceful 
___-___  Conventional ___+___  Self-confident 
___+___  Informal ___+___  Sexy 
___-___  Dissatisfied ___-___  Submissive 
___+___  Insightful ___+___  Snobbish 
___-___  Suspicious ___+___  Unconventional 
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APPENDIX Q 
ALTERNATIVE USES TASK INSTRUCTIONS 
 
 
Instructions: In the following task, you will be asked to list as many alternative uses 
for a common object that you can in ten minutes.  These uses should be different than 
the intended use: be as creative as possible. 
 
 
Example: Here are some sample responses if the object were a brick. 
A brick could be used as… 
A paperweight; 
A doorstop; 
Like cymbals for music; 
An anchor for a toy boat in a bubble bath; 
A weapon 
Remember, there are many different ways to be creative.  Offering lots of alternative 
uses may indicate creativity.  You could also offer very different types of alternative 
uses, even if the amount of solutions is lower.  Going into detail or discussing the 
surrounding environment could indicate creativity.  Finally, it could be that your idea is 
unique, something no one else has thought of. All of these types of responses can be 
considered creative. 
 
Instructions: For the next ten minutes, please list as many alternative uses for an empty 
soda bottle as you can.  Please list all examples in the free-response blank.  Please 
separate all alternative uses with semicolons (;) and/or use a new line, so all your uses 
will be counted. 
An empty soda bottle could be used as… 
[Timed Task – 10 minutes: Free response] 
 
